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This dissertation examines the effect of career concerns on the pattern
of investments selected by venture capital fund managers. I propose a simple
model in which managers strategically adjust the variance of their portfolio to
maximize the probability of raising a follow-on fund. The model demonstrates
that career concerns can encourage venture capital fund managers to ineffi-
ciently select investments that are too conservative. The influence of these
career incentives declines following good initial fund performance, leading to a
positive correlation between early fund performance and late fund risk-taking.
Using a unique data set of company-level cash flows from 181 venture
capital funds, I demonstrate that the intra-fund patterns of investment in ven-
ture capital broadly match the predictions of the model. First, I show that the
characteristics of career concerns in the venture capital industry are consistent
with the assumptions which drive the model. Funds who perform well in their
initial investments raise a new fund more quickly, and the size of their next
vi
fund is concave with respect to the existing fund’s performance. Second, using
a maximum likelihood methodology I show that venture capital fund managers
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Venture capitalists frequently claim that the best investment oppor-
tunities are often extremely risky ventures, which offer a small possibility of
an extremely high return.1 However, it is common to observe venture capi-
tal investments in firms that, at first glance, appear to compete in relatively
modest markets, which are unlikely to produce high returns. For example,
venture capitalists have recently funded a bottler of iced tea, an on-site car
wash service and a pizza delivery service in the United Kingdom.2 Notably,
all of these investments were made by venture capitalists operating their first
fund. Certainly these particular firms may have been attractive investment
opportunities, but their contrast with the type of high-risk firms usually as-
sociated with venture capital motivates a broader look at how the economic
incentives facing venture capital funds impact the riskiness of their portfolio
and the types of firms in which they invest.
1“I don’t know how to write a business plan; I can only tell you how we read them.
We start at the back and if the numbers are big, we look at the front to see what kind of
business it is.” - Tom Perkins, founding partner of Kliener, Perkins, Caufield & Byers.
2These portfolio companies were identified using VentureXpert, not the sample used in
the remainder of the paper. The company descriptions are taken from the database or from
examination of the portfolio company’s website.
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This dissertation offers a theoretical model and empirical evidence that
suggests concern about the ability to attract future investors motivates inex-
perienced venture capital fund managers to tilt their portfolio towards more
conservative investments. The strength of these career concerns changes over
the course of a fund. Managers with strong early performance demonstrate
sufficient skill to guarantee themselves a new fund and are thus free to choose
investments that maximize fund value, while poorly performing managers con-
tinue to cater to risk-averse career incentives. This stands in contrast to the
results in other asset classes, such as mutual funds and hedge funds, where
authors have attributed an increase in portfolio risk of poorly performing
managers to their concerns about future fund flows. (Brown, Harlow and
Starks(1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Brown, Goetzmann and Park
(2001)).
Venture capital fund managers, referred to as general partners (GPs),
receive finite capital commitments from their investors, the fund’s limited part-
ners (LPs). GPs select portfolio companies in which to invest the fund’s cap-
ital over an investment period of three to five years, after which they must
again face the scrutiny of investors to raise a discrete follow-on fund. GPs are
rewarded for performance implicitly through the ability to raise a new and po-
tentially larger fund, and explicitly through a convex compensation provision
known as carried interest.
The implicit career incentives of venture capitalists differ from those of
investment managers in other asset classes in two important ways. First, as
2
demonstrated empirically by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and confirmed in this
paper, the positive relationship between venture capital fund performance and
the size of the next fund is concave, with most of the relationship driven by
the failure of some GPs to raise any follow-on fund. Thus, career concerns
in venture capital tend to discourage risk-taking. Second, because venture
capital funds have a limited amount of capital and attracting new capital is
time consuming, GPs often secure commitments for a follow-on fund while still
making investment decisions for the current fund. With commitments for the
next fund in hand, high-performing GPs are less affected by career concerns,
and thus able to maximize the value of the current fund.
I formalize this intuition with a simple, two-period model of a venture
capital fund in which a GP chooses investments to maximize the expected
payoff from raising a follow-on fund and continuing his or her career manag-
ing venture capital. In each period the GP must choose between an efficient
investment opportunity, and two lower-NPV alternatives. The alternative in-
vestments allow the GP to strategically choose their portfolio variance by
increasing or decreasing the probability of realizing a “moderate” return with
a corresponding adjustment to the probability of extremely high and low re-
turns.3 The tension in the model is that so long as the loss in NPV isn’t too
3With the skewed distribution of venture capital returns, “moderate” returns may in
fact be very high. The intention is to model the trade-off between extremely risky gambles,
and those which offer a higher probability for more modest success. A useful analogy might
be to consider a baseball player in a slump who swings less aggressively, trading off the
possibility of hitting home runs in hopes of hitting more doubles and triples to raise his
batting average.
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great, the GP’s optimal strategy is to select the alternative investment whose
probability distribution places the most weight on outcomes which will result
in a new fund.
The model highlights several additional features of implicit compen-
sation in the venture capital markets, that may generalize to other settings.
First, investors in the model are rational. They update their beliefs about
GP skill after observing realized returns each period. Second, the value of a
follow-on venture capital career is not a smooth function of investor’s beliefs
about a GP’s skill. A large jump occurs as the GP crosses the threshold of
just being able to convince investors to finance a follow-on fund. Relative to
this jump, the investor’s perception of “moderate” returns as evidence of skill
determines the GP’s choice of portfolio risk. When “moderate” returns are not
sufficiently indicative of skill, the GP essentially faces a convex payoff func-
tion. Only extremely high returns will result in a new fund; thus, the model
produces the typical intuition that career concerns promote risk-taking. How-
ever, when “moderate” returns are sufficiently indicative of skill, the GP faces
concave incentives and will correspondingly choose the least risky portfolio.
There is reason to suspect that the venture capital industry represents
a case in which career concerns discourage risk-taking. Industry participants
describe encountering funds that earn the majority of their returns from one
or two home run investments. In evaluating the manager of such a fund it
is difficult to determine whether high returns should be attributed to skill or
luck. Given these concerns and the high skewness of venture capital returns,
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GPs may well be willing to trade off some probability of extremely high returns
for an increased probability of relatively good returns.
In addition to characterizing the direction in which career concerns
influence portfolio risk, the model generates predictions on how the influence
of career concerns evolves over the course of the fund. By allowing for early
fund raising, the model generates a pattern of investments, similar to the
effect noted in the mutual fund literature. This allows some GPs (those who
have performed well in their initial investment) to escape the influence of
career concerns and simply choose the efficient investment in the second period.
The empirical implication is that a GP’s early fund performance should be
positively related to the riskiness of the portfolio selected with the fund’s
remaining capital. This effect should be concentrated among less experienced
GPs.
In an extension of the model, I consider the effect of career concerns
on the optimal explicit compensation contract. When agents endogenously
determine the explicit compensation contract at the beginning of the fund,
the convexity of the compensation function is designed to mitigate the risk-
taking incentives of career concerns. Under model parameters where career
concerns promote risk-taking, the optimal explicit compensation is concave.
In contrast, when implicit career concerns discourage risk-taking, the optimal
explicit compensation contact is convex. In practice the explicit compensation
of venture capital GPs consists of a flat management fee and a convex option-
like provision known as carried interest. The model suggests that the carried
5
interest provision can be interpreted as a response to career concerns that
encourage inefficiently low risk investments.
I test the model using a unique proprietary data set covering the invest-
ments of 181 venture capital funds. The data was obtained from Neuberger
Berman, a global alternative asset management firm with over 30 years of ven-
ture capital experience. Unlike commercial data sets, this data includes the
quarterly cash flows and valuations for every portfolio company investment of
a large sample of venture capital funds. To my knowledge this is the first ven-
ture capital data set in the literature to contain detailed cash flow information
at the portfolio company-level.
Despite access to a particularly well suited data set, estimating the re-
lationship between fund performance and the volatility of subsequent invest-
ments remains challenging. Unlike public investments, for which we observe
the time series of i.d.d. returns, private investments generate a single observ-
able return when the fund exits.4 I implement a maximum likelihood approach
that identifies the effects of previous fund performance on the volatility of
subsequent investments using the common variation in the difference between
the realized return and predicted mean return across the sample of portfolio
4The difficulty created by this distinction becomes clear in comparison to the mutual fund
literature, where estimating the relationship between previous performance and subsequent
risk-taking relies on the time series volatility of daily mutual fund returns. The volatility
of daily returns can be taken as directly proportional to the volatility of the mutual fund
manager’s 6-month or 1-year portfolio strategy, given that the returns are assumed to be
i.i.d.
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companies.5 The approach takes the volatility of each investment as a latent
variable. The resulting model is similar to the feasible generalized least squares
approach to regression with heteroskedasticity.6 However, in this instance the
parameter estimates in the variance equation are the objects of interest, rather
than an intermediate step necessary to correct for heteroskedasticity.
My main finding is that following good performance early in a fund,
GPs pursue a more risky investment strategy with their remaining capital rel-
ative to their poor performing colleagues. This is accomplished by investing
in more volatile portfolio companies and by allocating their remaining capital
amongst a smaller number of investments (diversifying less). These effects are
particularly concentrated among inexperienced GPs. For a GP operating their
first fund, three years into the fund’s life an increase of 10% in the reported
internal rate of return of the fund corresponds with a 14% higher variance of
future portfolio company investments. The same increase in performance cor-
responds to a 5% increase in the initial size of portfolio company investments,
resulting in less diversification. In addition, I confirm that the characteristics
of implicit compensation conform with the assumptions of my model. The size
of the next fund is concave, with the effect largely driven by the GPs who fail
to raise a new fund. The speed at which GPs raise a new fund is also related
5The actual identification is slightly more subtle as the maximum likelihood approach
jointly estimates the parameters for the mean and variance. However, the difference between
the predicted mean and realized return captures the intuition for how the parameters related
to variance enter the likelihood equation.
6The approach differs from the textbook FGLS approach by allowing the mean return
to be linearly related to the variance, and by allowing for truncation at -100% return.
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to performance, with a 10% increase in the fund’s internal rate of return re-
sulting in a factor increase of 1.02 to 1.03 for the speed at which GPs raise a
new fund. Finally, I show that extent to which the GP’s current performance
is based on a small number of very successful investments (as opposed to a
large number of moderate successes) is negatively related to their ability to
raise a follow-on fund. This corresponds to the model’s prediction that career
concerns discourage risk taking when “moderate” success is relatively more
informative about GP skill.
This paper relates to the growing literature investigating the incentives
of venture capital and private equity fund managers. Chung, et al. (2012) use
fund-level data from Prequin to estimate that implicit pay-for-performance in
a first-time venture capital fund is of a similar order of magnitude to the ex-
plicit pay-for-performance derived from the carried interest option. This study
expands upon their work by linking implicit pay-for-performance to the invest-
ment decisions of managers. In a closely related study, Ljungqvist, Richardson
and Wolfenzon (2007) use a sample of portfolio company investments made
by buyout private equity funds to investigate a manager’s propensity to risk
shift in response to implicit incentives. This study differs from theirs in that
they model implicit compensation as a convex function of performance. Their
intuition is that GPs that have performed poorly will be unable to raise a new
fund unless they “catch up” by choosing volatile investments. Empirically,
I show that in venture capital implicit incentives are concave in performance
and discourage risk taking. However, my results do not rule out the possibility
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that a small number of funds may perform poorly enough in early investments
that they may expect to fail to raise a new fund without dramatically improv-
ing performance. These funds, which may seek out more risk, do not appear
to be prevalent in my sample.7
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2
describes the stylized model, which motivates the empirical tests. Chapter
3 describes the data from the fund-of-fund samples and presents the main
empirical results concerning implicit incentives and portfolio risk. Chapter 4
concludes.
7Such a non-monotonic relationship would be consistent with the model of Zwiebel
(1995), who shows that under relative performance evaluation high and low talent man-




A Model of Venture Capital
2.1 Model Setup
The model represents a venture capital fund as a sequence of two in-
vestment periods, after which a successful GP will continue their career by
raising a new fund. The timeline of the model is depicted in Fig. 2.1. At
t = 1 and t = 2 the GP invests the fund’s capital in investment opportuni-
ties. The GP chooses investments in each period while trying to maximize the
expected value of the implicit compensation they will earn from performing
well enough to raise a follow-on fund and continue their career as a venture
capitalist. Fund-raising for the follow-on fund can take place at t = 2 or at
t = 3. Raising committed capital for a follow-on fund prior to exhausting the
capital of the current fund is typical feature of the venture capital industry.
Allowing early fund-raising in the model at t = 2 allows comparison of the
investment decisions of funds who are able to secure early commitments for a
follow-on fund, with those who are still subject to career concerns.
2.1.1 Investments
The model represents changes in the variance of a GP’s investment
portfolio as deviations relative to a standard investment. The standard in-
10
vestment yields a payoff cstd ∈ {0, X, 2X} according to the following pdf:






(1− α) ti + p2 Cstd = X
1− ti − p Cstd = 0
(2.1)
ti is a parameter measuring the skill of the GP, which positively affects
the likelihood of both a modest and very high payoff. Parameters α and p
jointly determine the extent to which the likelihood of each payoff is deter-
mined by skill or luck. These parameters play an important role in the model
because investors, rationally updating their beliefs about the GP skill, will be
more likely to invest a new fund when the observed outcomes of the current
fund are heavily dependent on skill. The parameter α represents the extent
to which a very high outcome (2X) is more skill dependent than a modest
outcome (X). At the extreme, when α is 1, the investors learn nothing from
observing cstd = X, and thus will maintain the same beliefs about the skill
held prior to observing the result of the current investment. Similarly, both
the outcomes cstd = X and cstd = 2X become less informative about GP skill
as p, the component of each outcome attributable to luck, increases. When p
is very high, good outcomes are not very informative about the GP’s skill, but
the outcome cstd = 0 is very indicative that the GP is poorly skilled.
In each period the GP has a choice between taking the standard in-
vestment, or selecting one of two alternative investments. The alternative
investments allow the GP increase or decrease risk, which, under many pa-
rameter values, improves the probability of raising a new fund. For example,
11
for some parameter values, the only outcome that would result in a new fund
is c2 = 2X; thus, the GP may benefit from taking a more risky investment,
which improves the chance of a very high outcome.1 However, the ability to act
strategically comes at a cost, as both alternative investments offer a smaller
NPV than the standard investment. The alternative that places less weight
on the extreme outcomes, which I will refer to as the safe investment, has the
following pdf:
Pr [csafe = Csafe] =

α (ti − ε) + p2 − γ Csafe = 2X
(1− α) (ti − ε) + p2 + 2γ Csafe = X
1− (ti − ε)− p− γ Csafe = 0
(2.2)
The investment with higher variance than the standard investment,
referred to as the risky investment has the following pdf:
Pr [crisky = Crisky] =

α (ti − ε) + p2 + γ Crisky = 2X
(1− α) (ti − ε) + p2 − 2γ Crisky = X
1− (ti − ε)− p+ γ Crisky = 0
(2.3)
The alternative investments differ in volatility by adding, or subtract-
ing, γ to the extreme outcomes 0 and 2X, and adjusting the probability of the
1The solution is complicated by the fact that investors rationally anticipate the GP’s
investment decisions. While relative to the standard investment the risky investment results
in a high probability of realizing c2 = 2X, this outcome becomes less informative about GP
skill and may no longer be sufficient to raise a new fund. The solution provided in Appendix
A considers these effects and the resulting mixed strategies in detail.
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X accordingly. This adjustment alone does not lower the NPV of the alterna-
tive investments relative to the standard investment. To evaluate the ability
of career concerns to create agency conflicts it is assumed that the GP is less
talented at choosing or operating these alternative investments, such that the
effect of their skill is reduced by an amount ε. This way of modeling a negative
effect of deviating from the standard investment opportunity is meant to sug-
gest that GPs have a competitive advantage in certain types of investments.
Deviating from these investment to pursue a portfolio with a more favorable
distribution for raising a new fund is likely to reduce the effect of GP skill
on the investment outcome. In practice LPs frequently express their concern
that poorly performing GPs are straying from the fund’s stated investment
plan into markets where the GP’s background is unlikely to provide sufficient
competitive advantage. Figure 2.2 plots the pdf of each type investment the
for an average GP under certain parameter values.
2.1.2 General Partner Skill
GP skill can be interpreted as both the ability to select portfolio com-
panies with good prospects and the ability to exert a monitoring influence,
making it more likely a given portfolio company will succeed. In the model
there are two types of GPs, good and bad, which are in equal proportion in
the population. Neither the GP nor LP have private information about the
GP’s type and both will update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule, given
the performance of the fund’s investments. The skill of each GP is given by a
13
parameter ti, where bad and good types have skill tbad = t and tgood = t+ ∆tg
respectively, with ∆tg > 0. initially:




2.1.3 Compensation and Career Concerns
Both the GP and LP are assumed to be risk neutral with the discount
rate normalized to 0. In the base version of the model, the GP’s pay for
managing the current fund is assumed to be a constant, paid at the beginning
of the fund, and not sensitive to performance. This simplification allows the
model isolate the effects of implicit career concerns.
Implicit compensation represents the expected value the GP will receive
from raising and operating follow-on funds. For simplicity the value of these
future wages is summarized by a constant, F , which only accrues to GPs who
successfully raise a new fund. The outside option of a GP who is unable to
raise a new fund is normalized to zero. Investors will be willing to finance a
follow-on fund whenever the expected value of a GP’s skill meets or exceeds
the expected skill of a GP drawn randomly from the population. The resulting
relationship between performance and implicit compensation for GP i is the
following step function:
Vi, GP career =
{
F Pr [ti = t+ ∆tg] ≥ 1/2
0 Pr [ti = t+ ∆tg] < 1/2
(2.5)
The choice to represent the career concerns as a step function is moti-
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vated by empirical findings that suggest that the relation between fund per-
formance and the size of follow-on fund is concave, and that the concavity
is largely driven by the failure of some GPs to raise a new fund. Empirical
results in Section 3.2 suggest that the concave relation holds in this study’s
sample. Modeling this relationship as a step function is a tractable method of
obtaining the important feature of the data: that crossing over the threshold
required to raise a new fund is far more valuable than the marginal increase
in fund size thereafter.
Note that in the timeline depicted in Fig. 2.1 the venture capitalist can
raise a follow-on fund after realizing only one investment. This closely follows
the fund-raising environment faced by venture capital GPs. Raising a follow-on
fund is a time-consuming process that often starts long before the committed
capital for the current fund has been fully invested. Aside from raising the
largest fund possible, the goal for the GP is to have a seamless transition from
one fund to the next, so that they are not forced to ration capital. In the model
there is no explicit penalty for waiting for two periods to raise a follow-on fund.
However, the functional form of implicit compensation guarantees that raising
a new fund after one period is, at least, weakly preferred to waiting for the
result of the second investment. Good performance in the second investment
will not increase the size of the follow-on fund, but for some parameters, a
bad result could cause investors’ perception of the GP’s skill to fall below the
threshold required to raise a new fund.
15
2.2 Model Results
The model’s main results demonstrate the connection between implicit
incentives, the timing of fund-raising and the pattern of investment in venture
capital funds. A detailed solution to the model is given in Appendix A.
Result 1. In the first period the GP will select the safe investment. Following
a successful first investment, c1 ≥ X, the GP will immediately raise a new
fund and select a standard investment in the second investment period.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Result 1 demonstrates how career concerns affect early investment de-
cisions and fade following good performance early in the fund. Early in the
fund there is a strong incentive to select safe investments because any success
will be sufficient to improve the LP’s beliefs about GP skill. Because fund-
raising can be conducted before the second investment is made, successful GPs
have the opportunity to lock-in a follow-on fund; thus, their second investment
decision is not constrained by career concerns. The critical assumption is that
there is little benefit to demonstrating talent through additional success, while
the failure of subsequent investments could prevent the GP from raising a new
fund.2
2This result will hold in the case where the GP is able to raise a larger fund with additional
good performance, so long as the increase in fund size is not high enough to outweigh the
potential losses from poor performance.
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When c1 = 0 the GP cannot immediately raise a new fund. They must
face a choice between taking the standard investment, which would maximize
the value of the current fund and selecting one of the alternative investments,
which may increase the probability of an outcome which would allow him to
raise a new fund at t = 3. Result 2 demonstrates that unless the loss of
NPV for the alternative investments is particularly bad, the GP will always
select one of the alternative investments, provided they do not face a situation
where they cannot raise a new fund regardless of the outcome of the second
investment.
Result 2. There exists ε > 0, such that for ε ≤ ε, in any equilibrium which
contains positive probability of the GP raising a new fund following c1 = 0, the
GP will always pursue one of the lower NPV, alternative strategies with some
positive probability.
• For any pure strategy equilibrium in which the GP selects the risky in-
vestment following c1 = 0, the outcome c2 = 2X must be sufficiently
informative about the GP’s type for the investors to grant a new fund,
while the outcome c2 = X must not be sufficient to raise a new fund.
This requires that:
– α, the relative effect of skill on the probability of very high returns,
is large.
– p, the extent to which positive returns depend on luck, is moderate
– t+ ∆tg
2
, the average GP skill level, is moderate.
17
• For any pure strategy equilibrium in which the GP selects the safe in-
vestment following c1 = 0, the outcome c2 = X must be sufficiently
informative about the GP’s type for the investors to grant a new fund,
while the outcome c2 = 2X may or may not be sufficient to raise a new
fund. This requires that:
– α, the relative effect of skill on the probability of very high returns,
is low.
– p, the extent to which positive returns depend on luck, is low
– t+ ∆tg
2
, the average GP skill level, is low.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 2 depicts the regions described in Result 2 for a representative
set of model parameters. The first part of the result suggests there are only
two conditions when the GP will play a pure strategy of selecting the standard
investment. The first is when there is no chance of raising a new fund. This
occurs when t + ∆tg
2
is high, and adverse effect of learning that the initial
investment was a failure cannot be overcome by a successful investment. The
second condition under which the GP will select the standard investment is
when the reduction probability of a high outcome due to ε is so severe that it
swamps the effect of taking safe or risky projects. For moderate levels of ε, as
depicted in figure 2, when it is feasible to raise a new fund for some outcome
of c2, the GP will always select one of the alternative investments with some
positive probability.
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The model suggests that the effect of the current fund’s early perfor-
mance on risk-taking toward the end of the fund is determined by the char-
acteristics of venture capital investments. The model predicts that if very
high outcomes are highly attributable to skill, while moderate outcomes are
more dependent on luck (i.e. α is close to one), then we would expect that
venture capitalists should exhibit the same “gambling for salvation” behavior
that has been observed in the mutual fund and hedge fund literature. If, in-
stead, moderate success is likely to be rewarded with a new fund, then venture
capitalists performing poorly in the first should select safer investments of the












t = 1 t =2 t= 3
Current Fund
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GP raises new fund if
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E[ti|c1, c2] ≥ t + ∆tg/2
Investment
Figure 2.1: Model Timeline.
20
Figure 2.2: Distribution of investment returns for the average GP at model
parameters: α = 0.5, t = 0.05, ∆tg = 0.05, p = 0.30, γ = 0.05, ε = 0.04
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Figure 2 Parameters
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Period 2 Strategy Following c1 = 0 for p = 0.30,
γ = 0.05, ε = 0.02
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2.3 Model Extension - Endogenous Explicit Compensa-
tion
This section extends the model to consider the functional form of the
GP’s payoff when explicit compensation is determined endogenously. I assume
that at the beginning of the fund the GP proposes a contract that determines
how the cash flows from the current fund will be divided. The LP is assumed
to be competing among a large group of potential LPs such that he will accept
any division of cash flows in which he expects to break even in equilibrium.
I assume that the proposed compensation must be a function of the
aggregate performance of the fund, f (C1 + C2). While this assumption is
largely made to simplify the exposition of the model, it can be justified on the
grounds that there may exist several frictions, which lie outside of the model,
that would prevent the agents from writing contracts which are a function of C1
and C2 separately (i.e. f (C1, C2)). For example, there may be an un-modeled
moral hazard problem that requires the GP to expend costly effort monitoring
all of the investments for a long time after they are made. A compensation
function that gives more weight to the performance of one investment may
distort the incentives to efficiently allocate monitoring effort. In addition, this
corresponds to the contracts we observe in practice, which compensate GPs
on the aggregate return of the fund.
In addition I include several standard assumptions regarding the divi-
sion of the fund’s cash flows. First, I assume limited liability for both the GP
and the LP. Second, I assume that the compensation function for the GP must
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be monotonically increasing in the aggregate performance of the fund. The re-
maining primitives of the model remain identical to the base model considered
in the previous chapter.
Claim 1. Without loss of generality, the wage function for the GP can be
decomposed into a management fee A ≥ 0, and a monotonically increasing
performance sensitive function WGP [C1 + C2].
Proof. See Appendix B.
Claim 1 follows trivially from the limited liability constraint and the
monotonicity assumption for total GP compensation. The compensation ob-
served in practice consists of a fixed management fee, typically 2% of com-
mitted capital, and a performance sensitive portion which is based on the
aggregate cash flow of the fund.
The following results characterize the equilibria when explicit compen-
sation is used to achieve a first-best investment outcome and the GP selects
the standard investment in each period. The purpose is to provide an addi-
tional implication of the model that can be compared with the compensation
terms common in the venture capital industry.
This section does not address all of the possible equilibrium that do
not achieve the first best investment policy. The case where when explicit
compensation is insufficient to overcome the effects of implicit career concerns
is covered in the base model. In such an equilibrium the shape of the explicit
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compensation function is largely irrelevant, and many possible compensation
functions are admissible.3
I consider the optimal compensation function in two regions. The first
corresponds to the parameters in the base model where implicit compensation
would result in inefficiently safe investment following C2 = 0. This corresponds
to the area to the left in Figure 2.3. The second case corresponds the the area
in the right in Figure 2.3, where implicit compensation alone would lead the
GP to inefficiently select the risky investment following C2 = 0.
2.3.1 Case 1: Career Concerns Encourage Safe Investment
Result 3. For parameter values where career concerns alone would promote
inefficient safe investment following C2 = 0, there exists a level of career
concerns F̄ such that for F < F̄ the first-best equilibrium is implementable
and has the following properties:
A) There exists a function WGP [C1 +C2] which implements the efficient equi-
librium that is convex in the region C1 +C2 ∈ [0, 2X]. In addition there
exists ε̄, such that for ε < ε̄ all possible WGP [C1 +C2] which implements
3There exist additional equilibria where the explicit compensation is sufficient to prevent
some inefficient investment, but insufficient to reach the first best. Detailing all of these
equilibria is impractical, as with three investment choices at four decision nodes there are
34 = 81 possible combination of investments, many of which are implementable over a
small portion of the parameter space, all with different restrictions on the compensation
function. Instead the model focuses on the extreme outcomes. The base model focused
on the outcome when explicit compensation is unable to undo any of the effects of career
concerns; the extended model focuses on the optimal compensation that can be implemented
to achieve the first-best equilibrium.
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the efficient equilibrium must be convex in the region C1 +C2 ∈ [0, 2X].
B) There exists a GP compensation function that implements the efficient
equilibrium in which the performance sensitive component is of the form:
WGP [C1 + C2] =
























F if C1 + C2 = 4X
(2.6)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Result 3 demonstrates that when career concerns alone would generate
inefficiently safe investment, an equilibrium exists with an explicit compen-
sation function that shares many of the features of the management fee and
carried interest option observed in practice.
The compensation function can be decomposed into positive constant
A, which, like the management fee in practice, is not sensitive to performance.
Similar to the carried interest option observed in practice, the performance-
sensitive portion of the equilibrium payout function, WGP [C1 + C2] is convex
in the low end of the function’s support.
Result 3.B characterizes the compensation function that will produce
the first-best investment choices under the broadest range of parameters. The
26
shape of this compensation function is plotted in Figure 2.4. The upper panel
plots the implicit compensation resulting from career concerns. The middle
panel plots the explicit compensation. The lower panel plots the combined
compensation function facing the GP. Note that the effect of the explicit com-
pensation is to ”smooth out” the effect of the large jump as the GP crosses the
threshold of raising a new fund. Result 3.B demonstrates that the ability of
agents to ”undo” the effect of career concerns through explicit compensation
contracts is limited.
2.3.2 Case 2: Career Concerns Encourage Risky Investment
Result 4. For parameter values where career concerns alone would promote
inefficient risky investment following C2 = 0, if there exists a compensation
function which implements the first-best equilibrium, the equilibrium must have
the properties:
A) There exists a function WGP [C1 +C2] which implements the efficient equi-
librium that is concave in the region C1 +C2 ∈ [0, 2X]. In addition there
exists ε̄, such that for ε < ε̄ all possible WGP [C1 + C2] that implements
the efficient equilibrium must be concave in the region C1 +C2 ∈ [0, 2X].




Proof. See Appendix B.
Result 4 characterizes the behavior of the equilibrium compensation
function when career concerns alone would result in the GP selecting the risky
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investment. The important observation is that the efficient equilibrium, if
it exists, can always be implemented by a concave compensation function.
This stems from the fact that following C2 = 0, the GP will only raise a
new fund when C2 = 2X, thus explicit compensation must be concave in this
region to make the standard investment incentive compatible in the second
period. In the second part of Result 3 we demonstrated a general functional
form for the compensation function in the safe case, and that the general form
includes WGP [0] = 0. No such general form exists for the risky case because the
first period incentive compatibility constrains are not simply linear functions
of the second period constraints. However, it is shown in Appendix B that
WGP [0] > 0, thus the shape of WGP [C1 + C2] is clearly very different from
result from Case 1.
2.3.3 Implications of the Extended Model
The optimal compensation results from the extended model provide
additional support for the claim that career concerns tend to discourage risk-
taking in venture capital markets. To implement the first-best equilibrium,
agents facing career concerns that discourage risk-taking, can always use a
convex compensation function, which is similar to the carried interest op-
tion used in practice. In contrast, the model suggests that if career concerns
encouraged risk-taking, we should expect that venture capitalists would be
compensated by a concave function.
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Figure 2.4: GP Compensation.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Test of the Model
3.1 Data
The empirical tests of the model’s implications use a unique data set
consisting of all the individual portfolio company investments of 181 venture
capital funds. The data was provided by Neuberger Berman, a global al-
ternative asset management firm which manages approximately $11 billion in
private equity commitments which are invested through its fund-of-funds busi-
ness. The sample includes venture capital funds that received an investment
from the firm between 1981 and 2003. I exclude secondary investments (those
which were purchased from an existing LP), investments in sidecar funds and
funds with less then five portfolio companies.
Table 3.1 gives the descriptive statistics of the funds and their under-
lying portfolio companies. Panel A describes the moments of the data at the
fund-level. The GP of the median fund in the sample has operated 3 previous
funds, with the largest having operated 26 previous funds.1 29 of the funds,
1This count includes all previous funds for a GP, including geographic and industry
focused funds. The count was gathered from VentureXpert and the fund-of-fund’s records.
In many cases the previous experience was imputed from the series number of the funds (i.e.
the GP of the fictional fund ACME VII LLP would be assumed to have six previous funds)
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16%, are managed by a GP operating their first fund. Fund size is measured
as the capital committed to the fund in millions with a median value of $118
million. Unlike many other investment vehicles, venture capital funds don’t
immediately collect funds from investors. Instead, the fund receives commit-
ments from the LPs, which are called by the GP over the investment period
as required.
I measure the performance of individual investments and performance
of the fund’s entire portfolio using a modified internal rate of return. This is
an alternative to the typical internal rate of return, which is consistent across
the 7% of the portfolio companies and 52% of the fund-quarter observations
that exhibit more than one change in cash flow sign.2 To calculate the MIRR,
I discount all negative cash flows back to the initial investment date using
the five-year treasury rate in the month prior to the initial investment. The
intuition behind using long-term treasury rates is that the resulting discounted
cash flow represents the amount that the fund would have been required to
set aside in a risk-free security in the event they could perfectly anticipate the
expected follow-on investment needs. This variation of MIRR avoids throwing
out the observations with multiple sign changes over the cash flows, while
minimizing the impact of assumptions about discount rates, re-investment
rates, etc. The median final MIRR of funds in the sample is 13.9%. I also
2Cash flows with multiple sign changes result in multiple or non-existent internal rates
of return. Variations on the modified IRR method are recommended in widely-used intro-
ductory finance textbooks such as Parrino and Kidwell (2009) and Ross, Westerfield and
Jordan (2010). The results presented are robust to using Modified IRR only when an IRR
does not exist.
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report Total Value to Paid-in (TVPI), a multiple commonly used in the private
equity industry. TVPI is formed by taking the un-discounted sum of cash flows
returned from an investment plus the valuation of any unrealized claim, and
dividing by the total cash flow in to the investment. The median fund TVPI
for the sample is 1.9. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) has performance data on 577
venture capital funds taken from the Venture Economics database over a the
period from 1980 to 2001. Compared to the Venture Economics sample, the
funds in this sample are somewhat larger, with more experienced GPs, and
exhibit better performance.
A natural concern about this sample is that selection bias may influence
the results of my tests. While I acknowledge that the results may be interpreted
as pertaining predominantly to the larger venture capital funds represented in
the sample, sample selection is unlikely to significantly affect the results for
several reasons. The first reason is that the tests that are the focus of this
paper are cross-sectional. For selection bias to have an effect, the provider of
the data would need to express a bias toward the type of funds for which the
effect of performance in the fund’s early investments is more important than
in the population of funds. However, this seems more likely to be the case
for smaller funds, not the larger ones represented in the sample. In addition,
there is some heterogeneity in fund size. 46.4% of the venture capital funds in
the sample are smaller than the $103 million mean venture capital fund size
in the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) Venture Economics sample. Lastly, although
all the funds in the sample share the common characteristic that they were
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selected by the firm providing the data, the firm administers separate accounts
for some institutional clients who may have different investment objectives. As
a result, there may be some heterogeniety in the criteria which was used to
select funds into the sample.
Panel B also contains summary statistics on the follow-on funds raised
by GPs in the sample. 84% of funds in the sample raise a follow-on fund.
The dates and size of the follow-on fund are gathered from the sample itself
when possible, or from VentureXpert, which contains information on the first
closing date and committed capital of selected funds. There are eight funds
for which I am able to confirm that the GP raised a new fund, but do not have
sufficient information on the date or size of the new fund. These funds are
excluded from the analysis of follow-on fund-raising. The median new fund
was raised after 3.4 years of operating the current fund. The median increase
in fund size, measured as a ratio of the capital committed to the current fund,
is 1.5.
Panel C of Table 3.1 lists the summary statistics at the portfolio company-
level. The data consists of the quarterly valuations and cash flows between
each venture capital fund to its portfolio company investments, obtained from
the quarterly reports of venture capital funds to their LPs. Because this sam-
ple has the actual cash flows and exit dates, I can calculate the return of each
individual investment, which represents a significant advantage over Ventur-
eXpert and other commercial data sources.3 The median initial investment is
3For example Cochrane (2005) merges the VentureXpert data with the SDC Platinum
33
$2 million. Venture capital investments are often staged in multiple rounds of
funding. Size increase represents the factor increase in capital invested in each
portfolio company over follow-on rounds. The amount of follow-on funding of-
fered to portfolio companies is right skewed with a mean of 1.5 and a median
of 0.2. Holding period represents the amount of time in which each portfolio
company is held, and is calculated using only realized investments. Fund Age
lists the age of the fund in years when each investment was made. The median
investment is made 1.8 years from the closing of the fund.4 Holding period
represents the amount of time in years between the fund’s initial investment
and exit from the portfolio company. The holding period is calculated using
only investments that have been fully realized (i.e. the fund has exited the
investment). The 5.3% of investments which are not fully realized represent
both active operating companies and assets like patents, which are still held
under a portfolio company name, but for which no buyer has yet been found.
Previous academic work on private equity has taken different approaches to
handling these long lived, still active investments. Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
use the reported valuation of these assets, adding them to the final value of
the fund, while Gottschalg and Phallipou (2009) write off their value. For es-
timates of portfolio company performance presented in this paper, I take the
IPO and merger databases. He is only able to obtain the final value of 2/3 of the firms that
eventually IPO, 1/4 of the firms that are acquired and none of the firms which have another
outcome such as a liquidation.
4The maximum value for Fund Age at the time of investment is surprisingly high 13.9
years. This represents a small tail of outliers as the 95th percentile of investments is 5.5
years. All the results presented in the paper are qualitatively unchanged if the investments
made after 5.5 years are excluded.
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Kaplan and Schoar approach. However, the results are robust to excluding all
unrealized investments.
Note that the mean and median MIRR are slightly negative and the
median TVPI is less then one. This indicates that the median portfolio com-
pany investment returned less capital than was invested in the firm. However,
because of the skewness of returns and the properties of aggregating across
multi-year portfolio investments, the result is not inconsistent with the posi-
tive aggregate portfolio returns given in Panel A.5 Finally, note that the returns
are right skewed as the mean TVPI and MIRR payoff is higher then the me-
dian. This skewness is also evident in Figure 3.1 which plots the histogram of
individual portfolio company returns. Note that the highest bin, accounting
for nearly 30% of the observations, is the -100% - 80% MIRR bin.
Table 3.2 shows the properties of funds in the sample by the vintage
year in which the fund was raised and the comparison sample of funds listed
in VentureXpert. The observations of the sample are concentrated in the late
1980’s and late 1990’s. However, this variation appears to represent the general
trend in venture capital investment, rather then an artifact of this sample.
The last column expresses the capital committed to funds in the sample as
a percentage relative to the universe of funds contained in VentureXpert, the
leading commercial source of portfolio company-level data. To obtain the
5For example, consider a fund investing in three equal sized investments that all last two
years. Two investments are a total loss (-100% MIRR), while the other is sold for three
times the original investment (73% MIRR). The mean MIRR among portfolio companies is
-63.5%, while the MIRR of the portfolio is 0%.
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VentureXpert sample I select all funds identified as venture capital funds with
five or more portfolio company investments. I then exclude all funds run by
organizations other than private equity firms (e.g. corporate venture capital,
insurance agency affiliate funds, etc.) The size of the sample is relatively
large, representing 41% of the commited capital in VentureXpert funds, with
a tendency to tilt toward larger funds.
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3.2 Implicit Incentives
In the first series of tests, I establish the relation between early fund
performance and the size and timing of the follow-on fund. Observations of
follow-on funds are obtained from instances when the GP’s next fund is also
in the sample, from VentureXpert or from a search of Factiva for news articles
related to a follow-on fund. Combining these sources I’m able to identify
152 instances were the GP was able to raise a follow-on fund. The following
analysis excludes eight observations where I identify the existence of a follow-
on fund, but am unable to locate specific information regarding its size or
closing date.
3.2.1 Concavity of Implicit Incentives
A key assumption of the model is that the implicit career incentives of
venture capitalists are concave with respect to the performance of the current
fund, with most of the effect occurring at the extensive margin when crossing
the threshold required to raise a new fund. This assumption about the func-
tional form of implicit incentives drives the risk-averse behavior of GPs who
still face uncertainty about their ability to raise a new fund. Table 3.3 and
Table 3.4 test this assumption by comparing the response of the GP’s career
outcomes to performance.
Table 3.3 reports results from a probit regression that estimates the
relation between current fund performance and the existence of a follow-on
fund. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the GP raises a
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follow-on fund. The explanatory variable of interest is the MIRR of the GP’s
current fund, measured three years into the fund’s life.6 This measure is formed
using the complete portfolio of all investments selected by the GP prior to the
third year of the fund. The holding value reported by GP in the quarterly
report to LPs is used to value unrealized investments. Prior experience of the
GP is represented by the natural logarithm of the number of previous funds
raised. If the effect of current fund performance on the ability of the GP to
raise a new fund reflects changes in investors’ belief about the skill of the GP,
the effect is likely to be larger for inexperienced GPs about whom investors
have very weak prior beliefs.
Model 1 of Table 3.3 reports results of a specification which includes
dummy variables for the vintage year of each fund. This results in the exclu-
sion of 28 observations for which these vintage year dummies perfectly predict
the existence of a follow-on fund. Model 2 presents results with vintage year
dummies excluded.7 In both models the coefficient on MIRR is positive and
significant. The interaction between MIRR and experience is negative, sug-
gesting that the additional probability of raising a new fund with performance
declines with experience. The marginal effects of MIRR, which are reported
at the bottom of Table 3.3, are economically significant, particularly for inex-
6Results obtained using the MIRR taken at two and four years into the current fund
produce very similar results to those which appear in Table 3.3.
7Results are presented with and without vintage year dummy variables to demonstrate
the robustness of the result. Probit models with fixed effects, such as the one considered in
Model 1, offer a control for unobserved heterogeneity across vintage years, but the resulting
estimates are known to be inconsistent in the econometric sense. See Greene (2008) p.800
for a discussion.
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perienced GPs. For a GP with no previous experience, a 1% increase in MIRR
results in an additional 1.3% probability of raising a new fund. The results
suggest that the ability of a GP to raise a follow-on fund is positively related
to early fund performance.
Table 3.4 proxies for the expected value of a continued career as a ven-
ture capitalist (F in the model) with the increase in fund size from the current
fund to the follow-on fund. The increase in fund size is calculated as the ratio
of capital committed to a follow-on fund, divided by the committed capital
of the current fund. I regress the increase in fund size against MIRRt−1, the
MIRR of the current fund calculated in the quarter before the follow-on fund
is raised. Because we may expect that small funds have more opportunity
to grow than large funds, the natural logarithm of fund size is included as a
control variable, as is the natural logarithm of the number of previous funds
raised by the GP.
Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 present the results using all funds in the
sample. GPs who failed to raise a follow-on fund are assigned a size increase
of zero. These observations use the MIRR calculated five years after the start
of the current fund. Model 1 reports ordinary least-squares results. Model
2 uses a Tobit analysis to account for the censoring effect when no follow-on
fund is raised. The marginal effect of MIRR is reported in the lower portion
of the table for GPs with zero and three previous funds and other variables
set to their sample means. In both models the relation between fund size and
current performance is statistically and economically significant. The results
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from Model 2 indicate that at the sample mean the marginal effect of an
additional 1% increase in MIRR results in 0.75% positive change in the size
increase from the current fund. The results also demonstrate that the relation
between current fund performance and follow-on fund size is concave, but the
decrease in slope with higher fund performance is modest. In both cases the
squared term is significant at the 10% level, and roughly one-twentieth of the
magnitude of the linear term on MIRR. The standard deviation of MIRR
in the quarter prior to the closing of a follow-on fund is 81.9%. The Tobit
result suggests that for a GP with no previous experience, a one standard
deviation increase in MIRR reduces marginal effect of performance on fund
size by roughly 5% relative to the marginal effect at the mean (0.75 vs. 0.721).
Measured this way the concavity has modest economic significance.
Model 3 presents the results of an ordinary least-squares regression that
only includes managers who successfully raised a new fund. The intuition be-
hind this estimate is to examine whether the relationship between follow-on
fund size and performance is primarily driven by the extensive margin (the
ability to raise a fund, or not, demonstrated in Table 3.3) rather than the
intensive margin (an increase in fund size conditional on raising a new fund).
When the GPs who failed to raise a new fund are dropped, the marginal effect
associated with MIRR is insignificant and the point estimate is small. This
suggests that the relationship between current fund performance and follow-
on fund size is very weak conditional on raising a new fund. The results in
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 provide evidence that the model’s assumption that
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career incentives are largely driven by the jump as a GP crosses the perfor-
mance threshold required to raise a new fund is a plausible representation of
the empirical features of the data.
3.2.2 Timing of Implicit Incentives
The evidence in the previous section shows that implicit career incen-
tives are largely determined by the discrete impact of crossing the threshold
required to raise a new fund. Conditional on raising a new fund, the additional
marginal benefit for performance is small. Given these conditions, it is intu-
itive that a GP will raise a follow-on as soon as his track record of investment
permits. This intuition is formalized by Result 1 of the model. In this section I
examine the empirical relationship between current fund performance and the
speed at which GPs raise a follow-on fund. I employ a Cox proportional hazard
model. This semi-parametric approach allows me to avoid specifying a func-
tional form for the baseline hazard model, while retaining an easy-to-interpret
parametric form for the proportional effects of the explanatory variables.8 In
the Cox model, the functional form of the hazard rate is given by:
λ (ti, xi) = e
x′iβλ0 (ti) (3.1)
λ (ti, xi) represents the hazard rate at which firms with characteristics
xi at time ti raise a new fund. λ0 (ti) represents the baseline hazard rate at
8The Cox proportional hazard model is a common model of duration spells. Examples of
its use in the venture capital literature include Hellman and Puri (2000, 2002) and Lerner,
Shane and Tsai (2003).
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which GPs raise a new fund ti periods into their current fund.
The dependent variable is the duration of time from the first closing of
the current fund until the first closing of a follow-on fund, measured in years.
As in the previous analysis the independent variable of interest is MIRRt−1.
The interaction effect with the age of the fund is included because over time,
as investments are realized, the MIRR is likely to be more informative about
the GP’s skill. In addition, I examine the interaction effects of the GP’s
previous experience. As experience increases, the effect of MIRR on the speed
of raising a new fund may diminish as investors have stronger priors about the
GP’s skill. Finally, to control for exogenous changes in the market appetite
for investing in venture capital, I include the count of the number of funds
listed in VentureXpert raised in the year prior to the current quarter. The
analysis is stratified by vintage year to control for unobserved heterogeneity
across time.9
Table 3.5 presents the results from the duration model. The coefficients
presented in the upper section of the table represent the estimates of β from
Eq. 3.1. I report the proportional increase in the hazard rate associated with
a 10% increase in MIRRt−1. This increase must be evaluated at a particular
value of fund age and GP experience because the measure includes all the
interaction effects associated with a change in MIRRt−1. Results are reported
9Stratification by vintage year allows for different baseline hazard functions for each
vintage year, while requiring the coefficient estimates to be the same across years. As
a result, nothing is identified from the four vintage years that contain only one venture
capital fund.
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for a GP who is in the third year of the current fund (the median follow-on fund
is raised 3.4 years into the current fund). To compare the effect of experience,
I calculate the marginal effect separately for a GP raising his first fund, and a
GP with three previous funds (the sample median).
The results indicate that the performance of the current fund has a
strong positive impact on the rate at which the GP will raise a new fund. The
coefficient in all models on MIRRt−1 is positive and statistically significant
at the 10% level or higher. In Model 1, an increase of 10% in MIRRt−1
results in a statistically significant increase in the hazard rate of raising a new
fund in year 3 by a factor of 1.01. Model 2 takes into account the additional
effect of GP experience. The marginal effect of MIRRt−1 is slightly higher in
Model 2, 1.02 - 1.03. However, the interaction term between MIRRt−1 and
GP experience is not significant, nor is the difference in the marginal impact
of MIRRt−1 between a new GP and one with three years of experience.
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3.3 Portfolio Risk
Having established that GPs with positive early performance are more
likely to raise a new fund, it remains to be shown that these GPs will pur-
sue more risky strategies relative to their poor-performing peers. This section
empirically tests the model’s prediction about the intra-fund pattern of in-
vestments by looking at the relationship between initial fund performance and
the characteristics of the GP’s subsequent investments. I explicitly evaluate
two channels by which the GP can select a higher variance portfolio. In Sec-
tion 3.3.1 I demonstrate a positive correlation between early fund performance
and the individual variance of subsequent portfolio company investments se-
lected by the GP. Section 3.3.2 demonstrates a similar relation between early
fund performance and the size of subsequent investments (implying less diver-
sification).10 Section 3.3.4 provides additional evidence that these individual
channels effect the variance of the fund’s aggregate portfolio.
3.3.1 Portfolio Company Volatility
This section investigates whether the performance of previous invest-
ments is related to the volatility of subsequent investments. This corresponds
to the intuition from the model that, absent career concerns, GPs will seek
out more volatile investments because they offer the highest expected returns.
10Portfolio variance may also be increased by selecting more correlated investments. Given
the nature of the data developing a powerful test to investigate this channel remains difficult
and may motivate further study.
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To investigate this hypothesis it is necessary to provide a test that
evaluates differences in variance across portfolio company investments. This
analysis is challenging with venture capital investments because we do not
observe a time series of returns as we would with public securities. We do
observe the time series of valuations reported by the GP, but these are updated
infrequently, and the resulting measures will almost certainly be noisy and
heavily biased toward low variance.
To evaluate the effect of past performance on the expected mean and
variance of portfolio company investments, I evaluate the following empirical
model using maximum likelihood estimation.
MIRRi,j = max [−100% , β0 + β1 · IRRNASDAQ + νt + αmeani + εi,j] (3.2)





The subscript i is used to index individual GPs, while the subscript j
represents individual portfolio company investments. Each observation is the
MIRR realized for one portfolio company investment.11 The variance of each
investment is treated as a latent variable, which is imputed by maximizing the
likelihood function derived in Appendix B. In addition, the model accounts
11Each observation in Eq. 3.2 is the final realized MIRR of one portfolio company. The
main explanatory variable in Xi,j of Eq. 3.4 is the MIRR of the fund calculated from its
previous investments.
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for truncation at -100% return with a correction that is analogous to a Tobit
model. The expected return is driven by the cumulative return of an equal-
weighted index of the smallest decile of NASDAQ stocks available from CRSP,
calculated over the holding period of the investment, and the variance of the
portfolio company investment. In addition, the mean equation contains two
sets of dummy variables. Vintage year dummies, represented by νt, capture
unobserved heterogeneity in the average return of venture capital investments
over time. GP dummy variables, αmeani and α
var
i , capture unobserved differ-
ences across venture capital fund managers in the mean and variance equation
respectively.
The variance is modeled as an exponential function of a linear combi-
nation of characteristics Xi,j, which include past performance, age of the fund,
GP experience and the interactions of these variables.12 As in previous analy-
sis, performance of the current fund is measured using MIRRt−1, the return
to the GP’s current fund measured the quarter prior to the portfolio company
investment. The model predicts that current fund performance should be re-
lated to the variance of investments late in the fund, but not early in the fund.
Thus the analysis considers only investments made after the fund has been
operating for two years. In addition, the specification includes a control for
the volatility of public markets over the holding period. σ2NASDAQ represents
the variance of the cross section of cumulative returns of firms in the smallest
12This is similar in spirit to the multiplicative heteroskedasticity model of Harvey(1976).
Results from a linear model, where variance is modeled as a purely linear function of past
performance and other covariates are qualitatively similar to the multiplicative specification.
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decile of the NASDAQ, calculated over the holding period of each portfolio
company investment.
Table 3.6 presents the results from four different variations of the model.
The first column of each model presents the estimates in the mean equation,
while the second column lists the coefficient estimates of the variance equation.
Panel A presents results with vintage year and GP dummy variables included
in the mean equation. Panel B presents results with additional GP dummy
variables included in the variance equation.
The main coefficients of interest are the coefficients on MIRRt−1 and
Fund Age. The model suggests both effect should be positive. For each model,
the marginal effect of MIRRt−1 is calculated separately at the bottom of the
table. The results in Model 1 suggest that a 10% increase in MIRRt−1 in
the third year of the fund is associated with a 0.156 increase in the variance
of subsequent portfolio company investment. This represents an economically
significant 14.1% increase relative to the portfolio company variance across the
entire sample.13 Model 2 includes additional interactions with GP experience.
The interaction term is positive, but not statistically significant. Similarly
the difference in marginal effect of MIRRt−1 across levels of experience is not
statistically significant, with a p-value of only 0.534.
Models 3 and 4 in Panel B repeat the analysis with additional GP
dummy variables included in the mean and variance equation. The benefit
13The mean variance is derived from the 105.3% standard deviation given in Table I.
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of this specification is that it controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the
investments style of different GPs. The results are similar to those in Panel
A. In Model 3, a 10% increase in MIRRt−1 results in a 0.152 increase in
the variance of each portfolio company investment. This represents a 14%
increase relative to the sample portfolio company variance. The marginal
effects of MIRRt−1 in Model 4 are larger than in Model 2 and the difference
in marginal effect of MIRRt−1 across different levels of experience flips sign,
but remains statistically insignificant.
While the model doesn’t explicitly address the change in career concerns
with experience, its a trivial extension to suggest that career concerns should
decline as GPs develop a longer track record, and their type becomes well
known. In Model 4, the difference in the marginal effect across different levels
of experience is negative, as suggested by the theory, and quite large, however it
remains statistically insignificant. This may partially be an effect of the limited
power in the sample. Alternatively, it may be that career concerns remain a
strong influence for private equity firms with significant experience. While GP
is presented in the model as a single agent, funds are typically administered
by a group of individuals from a single private equity firm. It is common to
see some turnover among individuals serving as general partners from fund
to fund, administered by the same private equity firm. It is not uncommon
for private equity firms with significant experience to have some unseasoned
general partners who may still be subject to career concerns. Finally, the
skills required to be a successful venture capitalist may change over time.
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Experienced GPs may need to demonstrate their skill in new environments
in order to raise new funds. There are several examples of successful venture
capitalists from late 90’s who have faced criticism for their failure to invest
in social media.14 To the extent that these GPs may find it difficult to raise
capital for web and social media focused funds, their investment choices in
these sectors may be subject to large implicit career incentives despite their
long history investing in venture capital.
3.3.2 Portfolio Company Size
In addition to investing in more risky portfolio companies, general part-
ners can increase the aggregate risk of their portfolio by making larger invest-
ments in a smaller number of firms. Table 3.7 estimates the effect of previous
performance on the size of portfolio company investments. The dependent
variable is the size of the initial investment in each portfolio company divided
by the total size of the fund, then multiplied by 100. As in previous analy-
sis, the main variables of interests are MIRRt−1, Fund Age and the number
of previous funds raised by the GP. The model suggests the effect should be
present in the last half of the fund, thus as with the previous table the analysis
only considers investments made after two years into the fund. An additional
concern in this analysis is that the very last investment of the fund may be
determined simply by the amount of the capital remaining, rather then the
dynamics of compensation and career concerns. To mitigate this effect I iden-
14See Tam and Fowler (August 29, 2011) for a recent example.
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tify the last quarter in which each fund makes a new investment and remove
all the investments in this quarter from the analysis. This reduces the number
of observations to 3,122.
The first two models of Table 3.7 include fund fixed effects, while the
Model 3 adds additional fixed effects for the year each portfolio company
investment was made. The effect ofMIRRt−1 is positive and significant in each
model. The coefficient in Model 1 suggest that a 10% increase in MIRRt−1
is associated with a 0.066% increase in the expected size of each subsequent
investment relative to the size of the fund. The economic significance of this
result is modest, given that the mean initial investment in year 3 is 2.4%
of the fund’s capital. Models 2 and 3 demonstrate that the economic effect
is much stronger for GPs who are operating their first fund. In both cases
the interaction term between MIRRt−1 and previous experience is negative,
but it is only statistically significant in Model 3. Model 3 suggests that for
a GP with no previous experience a 10% increase in MIRRt−1 is associated
with a 0.094% increase in the expected size of each subsequent investment
relative to the size of the fund. This represents a 5% increase over the mean
initial investment. This result, that investments are larger as a percentage
of fund capital, suggests that GPs pursue less diversification following good
performance of early investments. For GP who has operated three previous
funds the marginal effect is less then half as large.
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3.3.3 Portfolio Diversification
This section examines the propensity of venture capital GPs to diver-
sify their portfolio after observing the performance of their early investments.
This section considers diversification along two dimensions - industry and ge-
ography. The intuition of the model suggests GPs who perform poorly in
their initial investments choose a more conservative strategy. This could be
interpreted as selecting a more diversified portfolio, which is less subject to
the risks that may be common among a particular industry or region. How-
ever, while industry and geographic diversification are easily observed in the
data, the scope for GPs to change the diversity of their portfolio along these
dimensions may be more limited than their ability to decrease risk through
other channels, such as those documented in the previous sections. Many GPs
attract financing by claiming that they have competitive advantage investing
in a particular industry.15 Selecting investments outside the fund’s core indus-
tries may signal to investors that the GP does not have such a competitive
advantage. Similarly, the ability of the GP to diversify across regions may be
difficult due to the importance of monitoring portfolio company investments;
the literature has noted that venture capitalists tend to invest in companies in
close geographic proximity to their headquarters (See Tian 2011). The costs of
deviating from the optimal geographic strategy might be too high, especially
for the less experienced venture capitalists, who tend to operate smaller funds.
15Examples of such claims are an information advantage, which can be used to better
evaluate investments, or access to proprietary deal flow.
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Diversification is measured using Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHI)





Capital Invested in Region (Industry)n
Total Invested Capital
)2
The industry definitions provided with the data are relatively narrow.
To create more meaningful industries for this analysis, each of the industry
categories provided with the data were mapped to the closest Fama-French
49 industries.16 As provided, the data categorizes portfolio companies into
geographic regions. To facilitate more meaningful comparisons “West Coast”
and “Northeast” were split to give portfolio company investments headquar-
tered in California and Massachusetts their own categories. A summary of the
distribution of the number of portfolio companies across industry and regions
is provided in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
Table 3.8 presents results from a probit analysis of the effect of previous
performance on the probability that GPs select an investment that increases
diversification (decreases the Herfindahl index). The dependent binary vari-
able takes a value of one when the Herfindahl index following the investment
is lower then the Herfindahl index prior to the investment.
∆HHI = HHIpost−investment −HHIpre−investment





1 if ∆HHI < 0
0 if ∆HHI ≥ 0
The advantage of using a binary variable rather than the raw change
in HHI is that the magnitude of the change in HHI for any given investment is
partially a function of size and diversification of the fund’s portfolio prior to the
investment.17 As with the previous analysis, the first two years of investments
are excluded, leaving 3,355 observations. 61% of investments increase diversity
across industry, while 53% of investments increase diversity across region.
Models 1 and 2 report the results using diversification among industries,
while Models 3 and 4 present results for diversification among geographic re-
gions. The interior of the table reports the linear coefficients associated with
each variable. The lower portion of the table reports the marginal effect of
MIRRt−1.
In Model 1 the marginal effect of MIRRt−1 is negative, but statistically
insignificant. Model 2, which includes additional interactions of MIRRt−1
and previous GP experience, produces similar insignificant results. The only
consistently significant relationship is that fund age is negatively related to
diversification among industry. This may be somewhat mechanical as late in
the fund when the GP has invested in multiple industries it is more likely that
any subsequent investment is likely to be in an industry which already exists
17Analysis performed using the raw change in HHI from each investment as the dependent
variable, and analysis using the quarterly change in HHI produce similar, largely insignificant
results.
53
in the portfolio. Model 3 and 4, which estimate the relation between previous
performance and diversification along region, produce entirely insignificant
results.
The results suggest that GPs do not alter their strategy with respect to
industry or region in response to early performance. This corresponds with the
intuition that costs to altering their portfolio risk through industry or region
diversification may be more costly than altering portfolio risk by selecting
individual investments that have lower variance or by making a larger number
of smaller investments.
3.3.4 Aggregate Portfolio Risk
Table 3.9 examines the intra-fund pattern of investment by simply sort-
ing funds based on their performance at given points in the fund’s life. Funds
are assigned into cohorts representing two year periods (e.g all funds in 1981-
82).18 Funds are then ranked according an adjusted MIRR at two and four
years. Using the adjusted MIRR, which is formed by subtracting the cohort
median MIRR from the fund’s MIRR, is intended to account for differences in
venture capital market conditions over time. Funds that have less than 20%
of their committed capital remaining or that make less than three investments
after the sort are eliminated prior to ranking. I examine the aggregate perfor-
mance of the portfolio of investments each type of fund makes after the sort.
18Two year cohorts are chosen to make cohorts large enough to derive more meaningful
rankings.
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Each observation represents the final realized performance from one fund’s en-
tire post-sort portfolio of investments, which is also adjusted by subtracting the
median post-sort performance of other funds in the same cohort. The model
suggests that the High MIRR group should pursue a more risky strategy, as
these GPs are less likely to face problems when raising a new fund.
Panel A of Table 3.9 shows that funds that performed well in their early
investment continue to out-perform in their latter investments, though the dif-
ference of 56% is insignificant, with a p-value of 0.216. The difficulty in having
power to compare means stems from the large variance of both groups. How-
ever, we observe a significantly higher standard deviation across the ex-post
portfolios of funds that performed well early on. An F-test of the 365% differ-
ence in standard deviation is significant at the 1% level. Because the F-test
for equality of variance is known to be particularly sensitive to distributional
assumptions Table 3.9 also report the p-value based on Levene (1960)’s test
of equality of variance. Levene’s test, which is more robust to distributional
assumptions than the F-test. shows the difference to be significant at the 10%
level. The exceptionally large difference between groups is partially driven by
a large outlier in the high group. When the outlier is omitted, the difference in
mean falls to 12% and the difference in standard deviation falls to 20%. The
difference in standard deviation remains significant the 1% level for the F-test,
but becomes insignificant under Levene’s test. Sorting the sample at 4 years
produces results which are less sensitive to outliers. The difference in mean
favors the high group, with an 18% difference in return. The large difference
55
in standard deviation among both groups is significant at the 15% level under
Levene’s test, with the better performing funds pursuing more risky strategies.
While these results fit with the model’s intuition about declining im-
plicit incentives following positive early performance, there may be other ex-
planations for this pattern. For example, the results could reflect a world in
which each GP pursues a constant strategy, with the more risky strategies
naturally resulting in higher expected returns. If this was the case, sorting on
early performance would naturally be similar to sorting on the GPs who pur-
sued riskier strategies. This explanation suggests that the standard deviation
of the pre-sort portfolio (the investments made prior to the sort) should also
be higher for the funds that perform well in their early investments. Table 3.9
shows no evidence of this effect. At two years, the difference in volatility across
the pre-sort portfolios is -8% with a p-value of 0.606 under Levene’s test. This
suggests that the volatility of portfolios the two groups chose prior to the sort
were relatively similar. However, we observe a statistically significant -7% dif-
ference in standard deviation across ex-ante portfolios at the 4 year point. This
suggests that the low-performing group may have invested in higher variance
portfolios early in the fund. While the results in Table 3.9 follow from the
model’s implications, the results are clearly sensitive to outliers. In part this
may be due to the low power of the test, which must rely on a small number
of observations. However, the results support the conclusions of main analysis
given in Tables VI and VII, that there exists a positive correlation between




This section presents results on the relation between the early perfor-
mance of a fund and the rate at which the GP invests the fund’s capital. While
this relation is not strictly a feature of the model, the model’s prediction that
GPs who have performed well in their initial investments are willing to take
more risk could be interpreted to suggest that they are likely to spend their
capital more quickly, perhaps with a lower standard of due diligence. In addi-
tion, GP’s ability to raise a new fund may be tied to the amount of the current
fund that has been spent. Typically the LPs of the current fund discourage
GPs from raising a new fund until a significant portion of the existing fund
has been invested, for fear that the GP may otherwise allocate the best new
investment opportunities to the follow-on fund. For example, two of the lim-
ited partnership agreements for funds in the sample contain an explicit clause
requiring a GP to have spent 70% of the capital in the current fund prior to
raising a new fund. While the majority of limited partnership agreements do
not contain such specific targets, the lead investors in a GP’s follow-on funds
are often LPs from the current fund, who may refuse to commit to a new fund
until a significant percentage of the existing fund has been invested.
Figure 3.4 plots the average cumulative investment of capital over the
life of venture capital funds in the sample. The darker shaded portion at the
bottom of the plot represents the capital spent on initial investments in port-
folio companies. As in the previous analysis of portfolio company investment
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size, initial investment is defined as capital invested in a portfolio company
over the first three quarters. The lighter shaded area represents total in-
vestment of capital, which includes all rounds of financing in each portfolio
company. On average, 56% of fund capital is spent making initial investments
in portfolio companies, while the remaining 44% is reserved for follow-on fund-
ing of existing investments. The plot demonstrates how investments in new
portfolio companies largely take place over the first five years of the fund’s life.
To evaluate the relation between early performance and the spending
rate of the GP, I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model in which the
dependent variable is the length of time until the GP has spent a given per-
centage of capital. Focusing on the time to reach a given threshold of capital
spent avoids three problems inherent with linking performance to spending
rate variables such as capital-spent-per-quarter. First, the amount of capital-
spent-per-quarter includes noise related to the capital needs of existing portfo-
lio companies that is unrelated to the managers incentives, particularly toward
the end of the fund. Because crossing a threshold of capital invested is essen-
tially a cumulative measure, the quarter-by-quarter variation in spending rates
is less important. Second, as demonstrated in Figure 3.4, the capital-spent-
per-quarter declines over the course of a fund with a trend that appears to
be non-linear. Finally, the maximum which can be spent in a given quarter is
100% of the remaining capital, such that the error term will be truncated in a
linear regression, resulting in some bias in the coefficients.19
19Both the non-linear trend in spending rate and the truncation of the error term could
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Table 3.10 presents the results with the cutoff percentage of committed
capital ranging from 70% - 90%. As in previous analysis, the marginal effect
of previous performance, measured by MIRRt−1, is the main effect of inter-
est. For each cutoff percentage of capital invested, I consider a specification
with MIRRt−1 by itself and a specification with MIRRt−1 interacted with
the number of funds the GP has previously operated. The upper portion of
the table presents the coefficients from each model. The lower portion of table
presents the median time to reach the given threshold of percentage capital in-
vested, and the proportional change in the likelihood of reaching the threshold
given a 10% increase in MIRRt−1.
Models 1 and 2 use the time until 70% of capital is spent as the de-
pendent variable. In Model 1, the coefficient of MIRRt−1 is positive and
significant at the 1% level. The sample median time until 70% of a fund’s
committed capital is spent is 4.25 years. Evaluated at 4.25 years, a 10% in-
crease in MIRRt−1 increases the odds of reaching the 70% threshold in the
next year by a factor of 1.05. Thus the effect of previous performance on
the spending rate of GPs is economically and statistically significant. Model
2 when additional interaction terms involving the number of previous funds
operated by the GP are included. For a GP who has operated three previ-
ous funds, a 10% increase in MIRRt−1 increases the likelihood to reach the
70% threshold within the next year by 1.04, which is significant at the 1%
be addressed using an appropriate econometric model. I’ve chosen the duration model as it
is less complex.
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level. Interestingly, the point estimate for the marginal effect on GPs with no
previous experience is 0.92, but not statistically significant, with a p-value of
0.305. This suggests that the spending rates of less experienced GPs are not
significantly different from zero. The difference between the marginal effects
of MIRRt−1 at different levels of experience is significant at the 10% level.
Models 3 through 6 present the same analysis using thresholds of 80%
and 90% of fund capital. The coefficient estimates and the marginal effects
of MIRRt−1 are consistent with the results in Models 1 and 2, and of similar
magnitudes. Together the results suggest that GPs with good initial per-
formance are more likely to spend the fund’s capital more quickly, however
this effect is concentrated among more experience GPs. The career concerns
hypothesis alone would predict that the effect would be stronger among less
experience GPs. The stronger results for more experienced GPs is likely to be
related to the necessity to spend capital prior to raising follow on funds.
3.4.2 Concentration of Returns
This section examines the relationship between the concentration of
fund returns and follow-on fundraising results. The concentration of fund re-
turns is defined as the extent to which fund performance is driven by a small
number of successful investments. Anecdotally, LPs suggest that it is particu-
larly difficult to evaluate the talent of a GP whose current fund performance
is entirely attributable to one or two “home runs”. This fits directly with one
of the implications of the model. Under parameters where moderately suc-
60
cessful investments are indicative of skill, but very successful investments are
largely attributed to luck, the model predicts the GP will select inefficiently
safe investments, consistent with the evidence presented in Section 3.3. Thus
we would expect, for the same level of aggregate returns, a GP whose success
is driven by a small number of very successful investments will face more dif-
ficulty raising a follow-on fund than a GP whose performance is driven by a
large number of moderately successful investments. To evaluate this relation-
ship, this section considers the effect of the concentration of returns on the size
and speed of raising a follow-on fund, similar to the analysis in Section 3.2.
To measure the concentration of returns I form a Herfindahl-Hirshman
Index (HHI) based on the individual contribution of each investment to the ag-
gregate performance of the fund.20 However, the measure of fund performance
used in previous sections, MIRR, cannot be decomposed in a convenient way.
Instead I form the HHI based on Total-Value over Put-In (TVPI), a multiple
which is commonly used in the private equity industry.21 For any investment
TVPI is formed by taking the current value of the investment, adding all cash
flows that the investment has paid out in the past, and then dividing by the
total capital put into the investment.
20The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index is being used in a different context here than in Sec-
tion 3.3.3. Previously the HHI was formed using the share of the fund’s capital allocated to
different industries and regions as a measure of diversification. Here the HHI is being formed
based on performance of individual investments. An HHI of 1.0 in this context suggests that
one of the fund’s investments was successful, while the remaining investments were all total
failures.
21TVPI has also been used as a performance measure in the private equity literature, for
example Kaplan and Schoar (2005).
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TV PI =
Current Value + Cash Paid-Out
Cash Paid-In
(3.5)
The advantage of using TVPI is that the average TVPI, weighted by









Thus a Herfindahl index can easily be formed based on the relative con-
tribution of each investment to the TVPI of the fund. The share of aggregate









Note that substituting for TV PIn and TV PIfund, the share of TVPI
from each investment simply reduces to the share of value from each invest-
ment.
SnTV PI =
Current Valuen + Cash Paid-Outn∑N
n=0 (Current Value
n + Cash Paid-Outn)
(3.8)






Figure 3.5 shows the pattern of HHITV PI over the course of the fund.
The plot includes the median, 25th and 75th percentiles. The concentration
of returns starts very high, as each fund only has a handful of investments.
Over the first four years HHITV PI declines as the GP makes additional new
investments. After the majority of investment have been made, the appears
to be a slight increase in HHITV PI as some investment perform particularly
well, and become a larger share of the value of the fund. Note that throughout
the fund’s life the interquartile range is large relative to the median HHITV PI ,
suggesting that there is significant heterogeneity among funds.
3.4.2.1 Existence of a Follow-on Fund and Concentration of Re-
turns
This section mirrors the analysis from Table 3.3 linking the performance
of the current fund to the ability to raise a follow-on fund. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the GP raises a
new fund. In Table 3.11, performance is measured using TV PI and the HHI
measure of the concentration of returns. If, all things equal, a portfolio which
is dominated by a small number of very successful investments is less indicative
of skill, we would expect HHI to have a negative effect on the ability of the
GP to raise a new fund.
Model 1 is nearly identical to Model 1 in Table 3.3, but with TV PI
rather than MIRR used to measure performance. The coefficient on TV PI in
Model 1 is 4.05, and is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that measuring
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performance using TV PI is roughly equivalent to using MIRR.
Model 2 includes the additional HHI term. The coefficient on HHI is
−8.87 and significant at the 5% level. The interaction term between HHI and
TV PI is not significant. Consistent with the intuition from the model, the
marginal effect of HHI on the probability of raising a new fund is negative.
This suggests that when returns are more concentrated among a small group of
investments, the investors are less likely to perceive that the GP has sufficient
skill to warrant a new fund.
3.4.2.2 Size of Follow-on Funds and Concentration of Returns
This section considers the relationship between the concentration of re-
turns and the size of the next fund raised. Results are presented in Table 3.12.
As in Table 3.4, the dependent variable is the relative size of the follow-on
fund, calculated by dividing the size of the next fund by the size of the current
fund. Models 1 and 2 include all funds, with GPs who did not raise a new
fund assigned a size increase of 0. Model 3 considers only GPs who successfully
raised a new fund.
Model 1 evaluates the effect of performance, measured by TV PI, on
the size of the follow-on fund. The coefficient on TV PI in Model 1 is 1.01, and
is significant at the 1% level. Model 2 includes the additional HHI term. The
coefficient on HHI is −5.52 and significant at the 1% level. The interaction
term between HHI and TV PI ia also negative and statistically significant.
The resulting marginal effect of HHI on the size of the follow-on fund is neg-
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ative. The sample in Model 3 is restricted only to GPs who successfully raised
a follow-on fund. The coefficients on TV PI and HHI are both insignificant.
This suggests that conditional on raising a new fund, performance has little
effect on the size of the new fund raised. This is consistent with the findings in
Table 3.4 using MIRR as a measure of performance. The results suggest that
when returns are more concentrated among a small group of investments, GPs
are likely raise a smaller fund, but as in the previous analysis with MIRR,
this effect is largely driven at the extensive margin by the GPs who are unable
to raise any new fund.
3.4.2.3 Time to Follow-on Fund and Concentration of Returns
This section estimates the relationship between the concentration of
returns and the speed at which a GP raises a new fund. The model suggests
that LPs are less likely to infer a GP has skill when their returns are largely
driven by small number of very successful investments. In such a case the
LP may wish to wait for more information from other GP investments before
committing to a follow-on fund. This suggests that the concentration of returns
should be negatively related to the speed at which GPs raise a new fund.
Table 3.13 presents a Cox proportional hazard model, similar to the
model considered in Table V. The dependent variable is the time from the
beginning of the current fund to the first closing of a follow-on fund. Each
model is stratified by the vintage year of the current fund.
Model 1 presents results similar to those in Table 3.13, with TV PI used
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at the measure of performance. Consistent with the earlier results, TV PI has a
positive and significant effect on the odds of raising a new fund in the next year.
Model 2 add the HHI measure of the concentration of returns. The coefficient
on HHI is -5.52, and significant at the 1% level. The interaction term between
TV PI and HHI is -1.53, and also significant at the 1% level. Together the
marginal effect of concentrated returns on the odds or raising a new fund is
strongly negative. For a fund in the third year with the median level of TV PI
prior to fund raising (1.2), a one standard deviation change in HHI (0.11)
decreases the probability of raising a new fund by 59%. This suggests that
LPs are uncertain about GPs whose returns are very concentrated among a
small number of successful investments, and often require more evidence of










































































































































































































Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the sample of 181 venture capital funds between 1981 and 2003. Panel A
presents statistics at the fund level. Previous Funds represents the number of venture capital funds
operated by a GP prior to the current fund. Fund Size represents the capital committed to the fund
and is listed in millions of dollars. Num of Investments is the number of portfolio company investments
made by the fund. Final MIRR is the aggregate modified IRR of the fund gross of fees, calculated
as described in Section 3, measured as of June 30, 2011. Final TVPI is the Total Value to Paid-In
multiple, formed by dividing the sum of the cash flows out of the fund and the value of any unrealized
fund assets as of June 30, 2011, by the cash flows from the firm to the portfolio company. Percentage
With Follow-on presents the percentage of funds which successfully raised a follow-on fund. Panel B
presents statistics for 144 funds who successfully raised a follow-on fund. This excludes 8 funds for
which I can identify that a follow-on fund exists, but cannot obtain information on the size of the
follow-on fund or date it first closed. Year Follow-on Fund is Raised gives the time in years between
the first observed close of the current fund and the closing of the Follow-on Fund. Size Increase is
the ratio of capital committed to the follow-on fund divided by the committed capital of the current
fund. MIRRt−1 at Follow-on Close represents the MIRR of the current fund in the end of the quarter
prior to the close of the follow-on fund. TVPIt − 1 at Follow-on Close is the TVPI of the current fund
in the quarter prior to the close of the follow-on fund. Panel C presents the summary statistics of
the individual portfolio company investments. Initial Investment Size represents the amount of capital
invested in the portfolio company over the first 3 quarters after the initial relationship is reported in
the data. Size Increase is the additional capital invested by the firm in subsequent rounds of funding,
expressed as a ratio to the size of the initial investment. Fund Age is the number of years following the
first observed close of the fund when the portfolio company investment is made. Holding Period is the
amount of time between the initial investment in a portfolio company and the fund’s exit, expressed in
years. Holding period is calculated using only realized investments. MIRR and TVPI in Panel C are
the modified IRR and TVPI calculated at the portfolio company level.
Panel A: Fund Level Observations
Mean Median Std Min Max N
Previous Funds 3.7 3.0 3.9 - 26.0 181
Fund Size ($million) 249.2 117.9 364.5 6.0 2,322.9 181
Num of Investments 36.9 32.0 20.6 5.0 125.0 181
Final MIRR 22.9% 13.9% 43.1% -19.3% 432.8% 181
Final TVPI 2.9 1.9 3.6 0.1 27.7 181
Percentage With Follow-on 84% 181
Panel B: Follow-on Fund Observations
Mean Median Std Min Max N
Year Follow-on fund is Raised 3.4 3.4 1.6 0.5 9.5 144
Size Increase 1.6 1.5 0.8 0.2 6.2 144
MIRRt−1 at Follow-on Close 37.5% 11.7% 87.9% -57.0% 836.5% 144
TVPIt−1 at Follow-on Close 1.7 1.2 2.6 0.5 31.8 144
Panel C: Portfolio Company Level Observations
Mean Median Std Min Max N
Initial Investment Size 4.0 2.0 5.5 0.0 33.8 6670
Size Increase 1.5 0.2 4.4 0.0 34.7 6670
Fund Age 2.1 1.8 1.9 0.0 16.0 6670
Holding Period (Years) 5.1 4.6 3.0 0.2 13.9 6318
MIRR -2.6% -3.5% 105.3% -100.0% 598.8% 6670
TVPI 2.5 0.8 5.7 0.0 40.9 6670
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Table 3.2: Sample Fund Characteristics by Vintage Year
Descriptive statistics for fund-level characteristics sorted by the year in which the fund closed its first
round of funding. Data is taken from the 181 funds from 1981 through 2003 that made 5 or more
portfolio company investments. For comparison, descriptive statistics are given for the sample of funds
contained in VentureXpert that are identified as venture capital funds, administered by private equity
firms or bank-affiliated private equity funds, and made 5 or more portfolio company investments. Num.
of Funds represents the number of funds in the sample which closed their first observed round of funding
in a given calendar year. Mean values are calculated by averaging over funds which closed in a given
year. Mean Committed Capital is measured in millions of dollars and is the total capital committed
to the partnership by both LPs and GPs. Mean MIRR is the average modified IRR, calculated as
discussed in Section 3 of the text. Mean TVPI is calculated by averaging the undiscounted sum of the
positive cash flows and terminal value for each fund, divided by the sum of the negative cash flows of
the fund. Sample vs. VentureXpert Ratio of Committed Capital measures the total amount of capital






















1981/82 2 44.0 7.44% 1.50 166 17.7 3%
1983 9 58.9 10.50% 2.04 77 26.5 26%
1984 14 62.7 9.91% 1.78 70 24.3 52%
1985 3 31.3 6.14% 2.36 55 21.8 8%
1986 3 98.5 14.04% 2.33 40 20.8 36%
1987 11 57.3 17.53% 3.01 43 42.9 34%
1988 10 93.7 28.64% 3.61 25 49.3 76%
1989 10 52.2 18.02% 2.63 29 36.7 49%
1990 12 83.9 22.82% 2.91 24 80.4 52%
1991 6 120.7 22.89% 2.36 13 79.2 70%
1992 5 99.4 26.39% 2.72 22 42.1 54%
1993 8 141.7 56.50% 8.38 23 49.7 99%
1994 8 107.0 31.14% 4.54 33 57.5 45%
1995 6 230.2 76.23% 7.58 29 57.4 83%
1996 3 244.4 73.09% 4.44 46 81.6 20%
1997 3 135.5 73.92% 4.14 68 71.8 8%
1998 21 257.3 41.71% 2.98 70 119.0 65%
1999 18 427.1 1.45% 1.20 124 145.5 43%
2000 22 820.7 4.58% 1.35 188 174.6 55%
2001 5 543.7 8.50% 1.66 82 154.9 21%
2002/03 2 262.0 -6.73% 0.84 81 93.0 7%
Totals 181 249.2 22.9% 2.86 1,308 83.7 41%
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Table 3.3: Existence of Follow-on Fund and Current Fund Performance
Coefficient estimates from probit analysis, relating the existence of a follow-on fund raised by
a GP to the performance of the current fund and experience level of the GP. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 when the GP successfully raises a
follow-on fund. MIRRt=3 years is the modified IRR of the current fund calculated three
years into its existence. Ln(Previous Funds) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number
of previous funds raised by the GP. The sample consists of 181 venture capital funds listed
in Table I, excluding 8 funds for which the size or date of their follow-on fund could not be
determined. Model 1 excludes an additional 28 observations in which vintage year dummies
perfectly predict the existence of a follow-on fund. The robust standard errors reported
beneath each coefficient are calculated using the method of White (1980). The lower portion
of the table reports the marginal effect of MIRRt=3 years on the probability that a follow-
on fund exists for a fund GP with MIRRt=3 years at its sample mean and experience of
zero and three previous funds.
Model 1 Model 2
MIRRt=3 years 4.75** 3.92**
(2.09) (1.85)
Ln(Previous Funds) 0.13 0.21
(0.20) (0.16)






Includes Vintage Year Dummies Yes No
Marginal Effect of MIRR ( ∂Pr. New Fund/∂MIRRt=3 years)
Previous Funds = 0 1.30 1.15
p-value 0.030 0.040
Previous Funds = 3 0.60 0.41
p-value 0.018 0.028
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.4: Change in Follow-on Fund Size and Current Fund Performance
Coefficient estimates from OLS regression and Tobit analysis relating the size of the follow-
on fund raised by the GP to the performance and characteristics of the current fund. The
dependent variable is the Size Increase of the follow-on fund measured as the ratio of the
committed capital to the follow-on fund divided by the committed capital of the current
fund. MIRRt−1 is the modified IRR of the current fund calculated at the end of the quarter
before a new fund is raised. Ln(Previous Funds) is the natural logarithm of one plus the
number of previous funds raised by the GP. Ln(Current Fund Committed Capital) is the
natural logarithm of the size of capital committed by LPs to the GP’s current fund measured
in millions of dollars. All models contain unreported dummy variables for the vintage year
of the current fund. The sample consists of 181 venture capital funds listed in Table I,
excluding 8 funds for which the size or date of their follow-on fund could not be determined
and 4 observations which are not identified due to the inclusion of vintage year dummy
variables. The standard errors reported beneath each coefficient have been corrected for
heteroskedasticity in the manner of White (1980). The lower portion of the table reports
the marginal effect of MIRRt−1 on the increase in fund size for a fund GP with MIRRt−1
at sample mean, experience of zero, and three previous funds.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(OLS) (Tobit) (OLS)
MIRRt−1 0.57* 0.76** 0.057
(0.34) (0.36) (0.37)
MIRR2t−1 -0.032* -0.039* 0.0023
(0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Ln( Previous Funds) 0.088 0.081 0.18
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14)
Ln(Previous Funds) * MIRRt−1 -0.15 -0.22 -0.029
-0.18 (0.20) (0.18)
Ln(Current Fund Commited Capital) 0.11 0.24** -0.24*
(0.096) (0.11) (0.12)
Constant -0.90 -1.50 5.37**
(1.73) (2.10) (2.24)
Observations 169 169 140
R2 / Pseudo-R2 0.362 0.143 0.426
Includes GPs With No Follow-On Fund Yes Yes No
Marginal Effect of MIRR ( ∂Pr. New Fund/∂MIRRt−1 years)
Previous Funds = 0 0.56 0.75 0.06
p-value 0.097 0.039 0.874
Previous Funds = 3 0.54 0.72 0.05
p-value 0.086 0.034 0.875
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Early Fund Performance and Time to Follow-on fund
Coefficient estimates from a Cox regression with time-varying covariates. The dependent
variable is the duration from the first closing of the current fund to the first closing of the
GP’s follow-on fund. MIRRt−1is the modified IRR of each venture capital fund calculated
at the end of the previous quarter. Ln(Previous Funds) is the natural logarithm of one
plus the number of previous funds raised by the GP. Fund Age is the time the current fund
has been operating measured in years. VentureXpert Funds Raisedt−1,t−5 is the number of
venture capital funds raised over the previous year as reported in VentureXpert. The table
displays the coefficients of the proportional hazard model, with the robust standard errors
listed below, calculated in the manner of Lin and Wei (1989). The hazard model is stratified
by vintage year. The lower section of the table lists the marginal effect of a 10% increase in
MIRRt−1 on the hazard rate of a new fund being raised.
Model 1 Model 2
MIRRt−1 0.14*** 0.31*
(0.031) (0.17)
Ln(Previous Funds) 0.15 0.16
(0.10) (0.10)
MIRRt−1* Ln(Previous Funds) -0.11
(0.10)




Model p-value <0.001 <0.001
Proportional Change Hazard Ratio - 10% Increase in MIRR
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 0 1.01 1.03
p-value <0.001 0.061
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 3 1.01 1.02
p-value <0.001 <0.001
p-value for difference 0.299
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.6: Fund Performance and Portfolio Company
This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the expected mean and variance of venture capital
portfolio company investments. The observed dependent variable is the return to each individual portfolio
company investment made after the fund has been operating for two years. Variance is a latent variable
imputed by the estimation procedure. A derivation of empirical model and log likelihood function appears in
Appendix B. MIRRt−1 is modified IRR at the end of the quarter before the portfolio company investment
is made. MIRRt−1 is set to zero for the first quarter in which investments are made by each fund.
Fund Age represents the number of years since the closing of the fund at the time each portfolio company
investment is made. NASDAQ Return represent the cumulative return of an equal-weighted portfolio of
the smallest size decile of NASDAQ firms in CRSP during the holding period of each portfolio company.
NASDAQ Variance represents the variance across cumulative returns to the individual NASDAQ firms in
this portfolio. Ln(Previous Funds) represents the natural logarithm of the number of previous funds raised
by general partner of the fund. Variance, the latent variable, is also included as an explanatory variable
in the mean equation. The standard errors reported beneath each coefficient are clustered at the fund
level. The lower portion of the table reports the marginal effect of MIRRt−1 on the expected variance
of a portfolio company selected by a GP running a fund in its third year. Panel A presents results with
investment year and GP dummy variables included in specification of the mean equation. Panel B includes
additional GP dummy variables in the specification of the variance equation.
Panel A: GP Dummy Variables Included in Mean Equation
Model 1 Model 2
Mean Variance Mean Variance
MIRRt−1 1.28*** 1.08***
(0.094) (0.34)
Fund Age 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.017) (0.017)
Ln(Previous Funds) 0.022 0.012
(0.042) (0.045)
MIRRt−1* Ln(Previous Funds) 0.12
(0.19)
NASDAQ Variance 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.0023) (0.0023)
NASDAQ Return 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.099) (0.099)
Constant -0.89* -0.35*** -0.89* -0.34***
(0.53) (0.099) (0.53) (0.10)
Observations 3,448 3,448
AIC 7,670 7,672
Investment Year Dummies Mean Equation Mean Equation
GP Dummies Mean Equation Mean Equation
Marginal Effect of MIRR ( ∂σ2/∂MIRRt−1 )
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 0 1.56 1.65
p-value <0.001 <0.001
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 3 1.56 1.88
p-value <0.001 <0.001
p-value for difference 0.534
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Panel B: GP Dummy Variables Included in Mean and Variance Equation
Model 3 Model 4
Mean Variance Mean Variance
MIRRt−1 1.57*** 2.05***
(0.13) (0.47)
Fund Age 0.092*** 0.091***
(0.020) (0.020)
Ln(Previous Funds) -0.029 -0.010
(0.071) (0.073)
MIRRt−1* Ln(Previous Funds) -0.31
(0.28)
NASDAQ Variance 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.0023) (0.0023)
NASDAQ Return 0.46*** 0.47***
(0.095) (0.095)
Constant -0.81* -1.19*** -0.82* -1.24***
(0.42) (0.34) (0.43) (0.35)
Observations 3,448 3,448
AIC 7,358 7,359
Investment Year Dummies Mean Equation Mean Equation
GP Dummies Mean & Var Eq. Mean & Var Eq.
Marginal Effect of MIRR ( δσ2/δMIRRt−1 )
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 0 1.52 1.97
p-value <0.001 <0.001
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 3 1.52 0.98
p-value <0.001 <0.001
p-value for difference 0.275
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.7: Portfolio Company Investment Size and Fund Performance
This table describes the relationship between fund performance, and the size of subsequent
portfolio company investments made after the fund has been operating for two years. The
dependent variable is the size of each initial portfolio company investment as a percentage
of the committed capital of the fund. MIRRt−1 is modified IRR at the end of the quarter
before the portfolio company investment is made. Fund Age represents the number of
year since the closing of the fund at the time each portfolio company investment is made.
Ln(Previous Funds) represents the natural logarithm of the number of previous funds raised
by general partner of the fund. The standard errors reported beneath each coefficient are
clustered at the partnership level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
MIRRt−1 0.66*** 1.14** 0.94*
(0.18) (0.44) (0.54)
Fund Age -0.027 -0.027 -0.044
(0.027) (0.027) (0.047)
Ln(Previous Funds) -0.27 -0.25 -0.038
(0.19) (0.19) (0.34)
MIRRt−1* Ln(Previous Funds) -0.30 -0.54**
(0.24) (0.27)
Constant 1.92*** 1.88*** 1.60*
(0.30) (0.31) (0.87)
Observations 3,122 3,122 3,122
Model R2 0.022 0.023 0.052
Year Dummies No No Yes
GP Dummies Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Diversifying Investments and Fund Performance
This table describes the relationship between fund performance, and the regional and indus-
try diversification effect of subsequent portfolio company investments made after the fund
has been operating for two years. The results presented are from a probit analysis whose
dependent variable is an indicator for whether each portfolio company investment diversi-
fies the committed capital of the fund across industries or regions. Models 1 and 2 present
the results for diversification across industry which is classified using the Fama-French 49
industries. Models 3 and 4 report results of diversification across the 10 geographic regions
depicted in Figure 4.1. MIRRt−1 is modified IRR at the end of the quarter before the
portfolio company investment is made. Fund Age represents the number of year since the
closing of the fund at the time each portfolio company investment is made. Ln(Previous
Funds) represents the natural logarithm of the number of previous funds raised by general
partner of the fund. Ln(Fund Size) represents the natural logarithm of the committed cap-
ital of the fund. The lower portion of the table reports the marginal effect of MIRRt−1 for
a fund in its third year with GP experience of zero and three previous funds.
Industry Region
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
MIRRFundt−1 -0.035 -0.18 -0.096 0.036
(0.074) (0.22) (0.073) (0.22)
Fund Age -0.025** -0.025** -0.0075 -0.0076
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(Previous Funds) 0.056 0.046 -0.088** -0.079*
(0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043)
MIRRFundt−1 * Ln(Previous Funds) 0.090 -0.084
(0.13) (0.13)
Ln(Fund Size) -0.12*** -0.11*** 0.061** 0.059**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 2.51*** 2.50*** -0.91** -0.89**
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45)
Observations 3355 3355 3355 3355
Model Pseudo-R2 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002
Marginal Effect of MIRR ( ∂ Pr Increase in HHI / ∂MIRRFundt−1 )
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 0 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.01
p-value 0.635 0.417 0.186 0.871
Fund Age = 3 Years , Previous Funds = 3 -0.07 0.01
p-value 0.417 0.881
p-value for difference 0.497 0.526



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.11: Existence of Follow-on Fund and Concentration of Returns
Coefficient estimates from probit analysis, relating the existence of a follow-on fund raised
by a GP to the concentration of the current fund’s performance among a small group of
the investments. The dependent variable is an indicator variable which takes the value
1 when the GP successfully raises a follow-on fund. TV PIFundt=3years (Total Value / Put
In) is measured in the third year of the fund by taking the sum of the net asset value of
the fund plus the cash which has been paid out by the fund, divided by the amount of
invested capital. HHITV PI,t=3years is a Herfindahl-Hirshman index formed by using the
relative share of each investment in the total TVPI of the fund. Section 3.4.2 describes the
calculation and interpretation of TV PIFundt=3years in detail. Ln(Previous Funds) is the natural
logarithm of one plus the number of previous funds raised by the GP. Each specification
contains dummy variables for the vintage year of the current fund. The sample consists
of 181 venture capital funds listed in Table I, excluding 8 funds for which the size or date
of their follow-on fund is unknown and 28 funds for which vintage year dummies perfectly
predict the existence of a follow-on fund. The robust standard errors reported beneath each
coefficient are calculated using the method of White (1980).
Model 1 Model 2




TV PIFundt=3years * HHITV PI,t=3years 1.86
(3.01)
Ln( Previous Funds) 1.54*** 1.18**
(0.54) (0.54)






*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.12: Change in Follow-on Fund Size and Concentration of Returns
Coefficient estimates from OLS regression relating the size of the follow-on fund raised by
the GP to the concentration of the current fund’s performance among a small group of the
investments. The dependent variable is the Size Increase of the follow-on fund measured as
the ratio of the committed capital to the follow-on fund divided by the committed capital
of the current fund. TV PIFundt−1 (Total Value / Put In) is measured in the quarter before a
new fund is raised by taking the sum of the net asset value of the fund plus the cash which
has been paid out by the fund, divided by the amount of invested capital. HHITV PI,t−1
is a Herfindahl-Hirshman index formed by using the relative share of each investment in
the total TVPI of the fund. Section 3.4.2 describes the calculation and interpretation of
HHITV PI,t−1 in detail. Ln(Previous Funds) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number
of previous funds raised by the GP. Ln(Current Fund Committed Capital) is the natural
logarithm of the size of capital committed by LPs to the GP’s current fund measured in
millions of dollars. All models contain unreported dummy variables for the vintage year
of the current fund. The sample consists of 181 venture capital funds listed in Table I,
excluding 8 funds for which the size or date of their follow-on fund could not be determined
and 4 observations which are not identified due to the inclusion of vintage year dummy
variables. The standard errors reported beneath each coefficient have been corrected for
heteroskedasticity in the manner of White (1980).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
TV PIFundt−1 0.42* 0.53** -0.12
(0.24) (0.27) (0.21)
HHITV PI,t−1 -0.90 0.32
(1.14) (1.03)
TV PIFundt−1 * HHITV PI,t−1 -0.47* 0.029
(0.24) (0.18)
Ln( Previous Funds) 0.36 0.12 0.10
(0.23) (0.28) (0.25)
TV PIFundt−1 * Ln( Previous Funds) -0.24 -0.076 0.060
(0.15) (0.19) (0.14)
Ln(Current Fund Commited Capital) 0.099 0.018 -0.23*
(0.098) (0.13) (0.14)
Constant -1.15 0.25 5.38**
(1.75) (2.36) (2.51)
Observations 169 169 140
R2 0.359 0.376 0.424
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.13: Time to Follow-on fund and Concentration of Returns
Coefficient estimates from a Cox regression with time-varying covariates. The dependent
variable is the duration from the first closing of the current fund to the first closing of the
GP’s follow-on fund. TV PIFundt−1 (Total Value / Put In) is measured in the quarter before a
new fund is raised by taking the sum of the net asset value of the fund plus the cash which
has been paid out by the fund, divided by the amount of invested capital. HHITV PI,t−1 is a
Herfindahl-Hirshman index formed by using the relative share of each investment in the total
TVPI of the fund. Section 3.4.2 describes the calculation and interpretation ofHHITV PI,t−1
in detail. Ln(Previous Funds) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of previous
funds raised by the GP. VentureXpert Funds Raisedt−1,t−5 is the number of venture capital
funds raised over the previous year as reported in VentureXpert. Each analysis is stratified
by vintage year of the current fund. The sample consists of 181 venture capital funds listed
in Table I, excluding 8 funds for which the size or date of their follow-on fund could not be
determined and 4 observations which are not identified due to the inclusion of vintage year
stratification. The table displays the coefficients of the proportional hazard model, with the
robust standard errors listed below, calculated in the manner of Lin and Wei (1989).
Model 1 Model 2




TV PIFundt−1 * HHITV PI,t−1 -1.53***
(0.37)
Ln( Previous Funds) 0.96*** 0.47
(0.26) (0.29)
TV PIFundt−1 * Ln( Previous Funds) -0.64*** -0.51**
(0.19) (0.21)




Model p-value <0.001 <0.001




As better data becomes available, the venture capital and private equity
literature is increasingly focused on understanding the economic incentives
facing fund managers, and the resulting effects on their portfolios. This paper
uses a unique data set to document several new stylized facts about these
relationships. First, I confirm the finding in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) that
the size of the next fund raised by the GP is concave in the performance of
the current fund, and I demonstrate that this relationship is largely driven by
the effect of successfully raising a new fund, rather than an increase in fund
size conditional on raising a new fund. Second, I show that the speed at which
venture capital GPs raise a new fund is positively related to the performance
of their current fund. Finally, I show that, following good performance early
in the fund, venture capital GPs pursue more risky portfolios by making larger
investments in more volatile ventures.
As discussed in the introduction, these findings stand in contrast to the
relationship between early performance, and subsequent investment choices,
documented for mutual fund managers. This is a particularly interesting com-
parison because mutual fund managers and venture capital GPs perform a
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similar economic function. This suggests that the differences in behavior are
linked to the institutional details surrounding these two forms of delegated
portfolio management. The model I develop suggests that the difference in
behavior is largely a result of the different response of career incentives to
performance.
This paper also makes a contribution to the literature on which types
of firms receive venture capital funding. This literature typically focuses on
demand-side effects related to the characteristics of the firms. This paper is
novel in that I suggest that the firms which receive funding may in part be de-
termined by the implicit career incentives of the GPs. An interesting extension
of this work would be to consider whether the effect documented in this paper
might have an aggregate effect on the type of ventures which receive funding.
Rhodes-Kropf and Nanda (2012a) document that during private equity booms,
when recent returns have been high and available capital is plentiful, venture
capital funds tend to invest in more volatile and more innovative firms. In
a separate paper, Rhodes-Kropf and Nanda (2012b), propose that this rela-
tionship stems from the GP’s uncertainty about the ability of the venture to
receive follow-on financing from a third-party. This provides a potential alter-
native channel by which the performance of GPs might affect the aggregate






The model solution is a Nash equilibrium consisting of investment
choices by the GP in each investment period, and LP decisions in period 2
and 3 to invest in the GP’s follow-on fund given each possible investment out-
come. In equilibrium the LP must update his or her expectation of GP skill
based on portfolio performance and a correct inference about the GP’s unob-
servable investment choices. Solving the model through backward induction
is somewhat tedious because the model is discrete and the type of investment
chosen at t = 1 affects beliefs about the GP’s skill, which is an important state
variable in the t = 2 investment decision. Fortunately, the distribution of re-
turns in the model, which are motivated by the relatively infrequent success of
venture capital investing, allow a shortcut to immediately give Result 1 which
states the optimal first period investment decision.
A.1 Result 1
Result 1 shows that when the GP performs sufficiently well in the first
period, he is guaranteed a second fund; thus, there is no conflict between
maximizing the value of the current fund and the value of the GP’s career.
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Proof. First, note that in the first period the outcomes C1 = X, 2X will be
sufficient to raise a new fund after one period regardless of which investment
is chosen in period 1. All of the investment choices can be written in the form:
Pr [c1 = C1] =

αti + a C1 = 2X
(1− α) ti + b C1 = X
1− ti − (a+ b) C1 = 0
(A.1)
By Bayes rule:
Pr [ti = t+ ∆tg | c1] =




Pr [ti = t+ ∆tg | c1 = 2X] =
α (t+ ∆tg) + a




Pr [ti = t+ ∆tg | c1 = X] =
(1− α) (t+ ∆tg) + b




Pr [ti = t+ ∆tg | c1 = 0] =
1− t−∆tg − a− b





The threshold for the GP to be able to raise a new fund is Pr [ti = t+ ∆tg] ≥
1/2. For any value of α the GP will be able to raise a new fund following
c1 ≥ X, because even when a particular outcome is entirely dependent on luck
(e.g. outcome c1 = X when α = 1), the GP will still be at least as good
as another random draw from the population. The following table gives the
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Deviation ∆ Pr (c1 = X) ∆ Pr (c1 = 2X) ∆ Pr (c1 ∈ {X, 2X})
Safe 2γ − (1− α)ε −γ − αε γ − ε
Risky −2γ − (1− α)ε γ − αε −γ − ε
change in the probability of each outcome by selecting the one of the alterna-
tive investments, relative to the standard investment.
Its clear that selecting the safe investment in period 1 results in the
highest probability of raising a new fund. In the second period, given that
they have raised a new fund, the GP has no incentive to deviate from the
highest NPV project, and thus will pick the standard investment.
A.2 Result 2
In this section I characterize the possible equilibrium strategies, follow-
ing c1 = 0. The equilibrium requires that the investors hold correct beliefs
about the investment choice of the GP, and given those beliefs, the GP’s in-
vestment choice provides the highest expected value. First I consider pure
strategies.
A.2.1 Pure Strategy Selecting Standard Investment
When under some outcome of c2 the GP will be able to raise a new
fund and ε is sufficiently low, a pure strategy equilibria of taking the standard
investment does not exist, which is equivalent to the first statement in Result
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2. The first requirement states that one failure in the first period (c1 = 0) is
not a sufficiently poor signal about the GP’s skill to prevent him from raising
a new fund regardless of the outcome of the second investment. The second
requirement is a bound on how much NPV the GP would be willing to give
up to pursue one of the alternative projects.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium where the GP
selects the standard investment following c1 = 0, and following either c2 = X
or c2 = 2X (or both), the beliefs about the GP’s skill would be sufficient to
allow them to raise a new fund. It must be the case that deviating to select
a different investment would not result in a higher expected value for the GP.
Given that the value to a follow-on career is constant, the change in expected
value for each alternative investment can be characterized by the change in
probability across each outcome.
Deviation ∆ Pr (c2 = X) ∆ Pr (c2 = 2X) ∆ Pr (c2 ∈ {X, 2X})
Safe 2γ − (1− α) ε −γ − αε γ − ε
Risky −2γ − (1− α) ε γ − αε −γ − ε
The table above demonstrates that as ε→ 0, for every combination of
outcomes which would result in a new fund, there is an alternative investment
which would provide a higher expected value than the standard investment.
Consider the case when c2 = 2X will garner the GP a new fund, but c2 = X
will not. The probability of earning a fund after selecting the risky investment
as ε → 0 is higher by γ. Thus, selecting the risky investment would be a
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beneficial deviation. In the case where only the outcome c2 = X or when both
c2 = X and c2 = 2X would result in new funds, as ε → 0, deviating to select
the safe investment would increase the probability of raising a new fund by 2γ
and γ respectively. Thus, the safe investment would be strictly preferred over
the standard investment. Continuity ensures that this result holds up to some
ε > 0, where the reduced effect of skill in the alternative investments outweighs
the potential benefit from adding or subtracting 2γ from the probability of a
moderate outcome.
A.2.2 Pure Strategy Selecting Risky Investment
First I calculate the change in probability for each outcome that would
result from choosing an investment other than the risky investment.
Deviation ∆ Pr (c2 = X) ∆ Pr (c2 = 2X) ∆ Pr (c2 ∈ {X, 2X})
Standard 2γ + (1− α) ε −γαε γ + ε
Safe 4γ −2γ 2γ
The table shows that the only situation in which the GP would not
find it beneficial to deviate from the risky investment pure strategy is when
c2 = 2X, but not c2 = X, will result in new fund. Given the safe investment
selected in period 1 was a failure c1 = 0, for c2 = 2X to raise a new fund Bayes
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rule gives the following:[
α (t+ ∆tg − ε) + p2 − γ
]
(1− t−∆tg − p− γ)[
α (t+ ∆tg − ε) + p2 − γ
]
(1− t−∆tg − p− γ) +
[



















p− (α + 1)
2α
γ (A.7)
Similarly it can be shown that for c2 = X to not result in a new fund















Both inequalities are more likely to be satisfied when α is large; thus,
this equilibrium is likely to be supported when c2 = 2X is more informative
about the GP’s type than c2 = X. The other parameters of interest, p and
t − ∆tg
2
have opposite effects on each inequality. If p is too high, then the
outcome c2 = 2X will be largely attributed to luck, and the GP will not be able
to raise a new fund following c2 = 2X; thus, selecting the risky investment will
do them no good. Similarly, when p is too low, c2 = X will be sufficient to raise
a new fund; thus, the GP would be better off by selecting the safe investment
which has a higher probability mass over c2 ≥ X. A similar intuition follows
for t − ∆tg
2
. When this value is high, the average GP stands a fairly good
change of being successful such that the result c2 = 2X is not sufficiently




low, any outcome c2 ≥ X is sufficient to raise a new fund and the safe option
provides more probability mass, which will result in a new fund.
A.2.3 Pure Strategy Selecting Safe Investment
The following table gives the change in in probability for each outcome
that would results from choosing an investment other than the safe investment.
Deviation ∆ Pr (c2 = X) ∆ Pr (c2 = 2X) ∆ Pr (c2 ∈ {X, 2X})
Standard −2γ + (1− α) ε γ + αε −γ + ε
Risky −4γ 2γ −2γ
The table demonstrates that any time in which c2 = X results in a new
fund, the GP will not benefit from deviating from the safe investment. The
intuition is that the safe investment provides the most probability mass above
c2 ≥ X, so that any deviation would decrease the odds of raising a new fund.
As before, Bayes rule can be used to compute the inequality which ensures that
the GP will raise a new fund following c2 = X, given that investors believe he
will select theR safe investment.
t− ∆tg
2





Because there is only one inequality, the effects of each parameter are
less ambiguous. The inequality is more likely to hold when α, p are small.
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This coincides with the intuition that when c2 = X is very informative about
the GP’s type, the GP will select the safe investments which puts relatively
more weight on c2 = X.
A.2.4 Mixed Strategies
In the regions where pure strategies equilibria are infeasible because of
incentive constraints, there may exist a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
the GP randomly draws between a standard investment and one of the alter-
native investments. To remain incentive-compatible, a mixed strategy requires
that the agent be indifferent between the two pure strategies involved. This
will require that for c2 = X investors will be exactly indifferent between the
GP and a new GP drawn from the population and the general partner will
be granted a new fund with some positive probability less than one. This is
demonstrated by setting equal the expected value of Eq. 2.5 under two pure
strategies and simplifying. The following relationship must hold for mixed
strategy consisting of the safe and standard investment.
Pr [New Fund | c1 = 0, c2 = X] =
(γ + αε)
(2γ − (1− α) ε)
Pr [New Fund | c1 = 0, c2 = 2X]
(A.10)
Note that Eq. A.10 can be satisfied under two conditions. The first
is that neither c2 = X nor c2 = 2X result in a new fund, so the GP is
entirely indifferent to his investment choice. The second is that both c2 = X
and c2 = 2X will result in a new fund with some positive probability, with the
probability of a new fund being raised following c2 = X being strictly less than
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one. For the probability of raising a new fund to be less than one requires that
investors be indifferent between financing the current GP, and drawing a new
one from the population. The pdf for a mixed strategy consisting of selecting
the safe investment with probability m and selecting the standard investment
with probability 1−m is given by:
Pr [cmixsafe = Cmixsafe] =

α (ti −mε) + p2 −mγ Cmixsafe = 2X
(1− α) (ti −mε) + p2 + 2mγ Cmixsafe = X
1− (ti −mε)− p−mγ Cmixsafe = 0
(A.11)
When the GP’s first investment failed, c1 = 0; ensuring that the GP















Ensuring that following c2 = X investors are indifferent between in-
vesting in the current GP, and a new GP drawn from the population, requires














p− (2m+ 1− α)
2 (1− α)
γ (A.13)
So long as ε is rather small, Eq. A.13 is decreasing in m, so that for a
given α the region where a safe/standard mixed strategy is feasible lies from the
result of Eq. A.13 at m = 1, to an upper boundary where m = 0, or Eq. A.12
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binds. To when Eq. A.12 binds we set the right hand side of Eq. A.12 and










γ (1 + α)
)
(A.14)
This results in the following region where a mixed strategy consisting














Following the same arguments it can be shown that the feasible region





































The feasible regions for mixed strategies, as well as those for pure strate-




The model solution is a Nash equilibrium which includes an explicit
compensation function in addition to the GP’s investment choices and LP’s
follow-on funding decisions considered in the base model. Results from the
extended model focus on the GP’s compensation function when agents use
explicit contracts to return to the first-best equilibrium in which the standard
investment is chosen at each period.
B.1 Claim 1
Claim 1, given in the text, suggests the explicit compensation function
can be written without loss of generality in terms of a flat management fee,
A ≥ 0, and a performance sensitive portion.
GP Explicit Compensation = A+Wgp [C1 + C2] (B.1)
This follows trivially from the limited liability and monotonicity con-
straint. Suppose the total compensation of the GP is given by a function
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Comp [C1 + C2]. Define:
A = Comp[0] (B.2)
Wgp [C1 + C2] = Comp [C1 + C2]− Comp[0] (B.3)
A ≥ 0 by the limited liability constraint on Comp [C1 + C2], and the
monotonicity constraint is preserved in Wgp [C1 + C2].
B.2 Result 3
Proof. For the compensation function to result in the efficient equilibrium, at
each node the expected payoff to the GP for selecting the standard investment,
must be superior to the payoff from both the risky investment and the safe
investment. The following list gives the inventive compatibility constraints
at each node. The first constraint in each pair ensures that the standard
investment is preferred to the safe investment. The second constraint in each
pair ensures that the standard investment is preferred to the risky investment.
Incentive Compatibility Constraints
Following C1 = 2X:
(γ + αε)Wgp [4X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [3X] + (γ − ε)Wgp [2X] ≥ 0 (B.4)
(−γ + αε)Wgp [4X]+(2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [3X]+(−γ − ε)Wgp [2X] ≥ 0 (B.5)
Following C1 = X:
(γ + αε)Wgp [3X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [2X] + (γ − ε)Wgp [X] ≥ 0 (B.6)
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(−γ + αε)Wgp [3X]+(2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [2X]+(−γ − ε)Wgp [X] ≥ 0 (B.7)
Following C1 = 0:
(γ + αε)Wgp [2X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [X] + (−γ + ε)F ≥ 0 (B.8)


































































{(−γ + αε)Wgp [2X] + (2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [X] + (γ + ε)F}
≥ 0(B.11)
Note that the first period constraints, B.10 and B.13 are redundant, as
they are just a linear combination of the second period constraints.
The solution is also constrained by the typical investor rationality con-
straint, requiring LP’s to receive expected cash flows which are greater or equal











































































[1− t−∆tg − p] +
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[1− t−∆tg − p] +
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Result 3.A - Convexity of Wgp [C1 + C2]
Constraint B.13 can be re-written as:
Wgp [2X] ≥
[
































By continuity there must exist ε̄ such thatWgp [C1 + C2] must be convex
in the region C1 + C2 ∈ [0, 2X] for ε ≤ ε̄. The following result will show
that if the efficient equilibrium is implementable there exists a solution with
Wgp [X] = 0, such that Wgp [C1 + C2] is convex in the region C1 +C2 ∈ [0, 2X].
Result 3.B - General Form of Wgp [C1 + C2]
First, I show that if there exists an equilibrium which implements the
standard investment in each period, then there must exist and wage function
which implements the efficient equilibrium and all the investment compara-
bility constrains which require the standard investment to be preferred to the
safe investment hold with equality (Constrains B.4, B.6, B.8).
w.l.o.g. following C1 = 2X, Standard ≥ Safe constrain binds
First consider the case where exists a wage function A, Wgp [C1 + C2]
in which results in the GP selecting the standard investment in each period
and where Contraint B.4 doesn’t bind:
(γ + αε)Wgp [4X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [3X] + (γ − ε)Wgp [2X] = S ≥ 0
(B.17)
Now consider an alternative compensation function:
W ′gp [C1 + C2] =
{
Wgp [C1 + C2] C1 + C2 ≤ 3X

























The alternative compensation function clearly relaxes Constrain B.5,
such that it must now be slack. By construction Contraint B.4 must bind, and
the investor rationality constrain is unchanged. All other constrains are unnaf-
facted by the change in Wgp [4X], this A
′, W ′gp [C1 + C2] must also implement
the efficient equilibrium.
w.l.o.g. following C1 = X, Standard ≥ Safe constrain binds
Now consider the case where there exists a wage function which imple-
ments the equilibrium wage function,A, Wgp [C1 + C2] in which Constraint B.6
does not bind, such that
(γ + αε)Wgp [3X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [2X] + (γ − ε)Wgp [X] = S ≥ 0
(B.20)
Now consider an alternative compensation function:
W ′gp [C1 + C2] =
































































The alternative compensation function clearly relaxes Constrain B.7,
such that it must now be slack. By construction Constraint B.6 must bind,
and the investor rationality constrain is unchanged. Also by construction
Constraint B.4 and Constraint B.5 remain unchanged. All other constrains are
unnaffacted by the change in Wgp [4X] and Wgp [3X], thus A
′, W ′gp [C1 + C2]
must also also implement the efficient equilibrium.
w.l.o.g. following C1 = 0, Standard ≥ Safe constrain binds
Now consider the case where there exists a wage function which imple-
ments the equilibrium wage function,A, Wgp [C1 + C2] in which ConstraintB.8
does not bind, such that
(γ + αε)Wgp [2X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [X] + (−γ + ε)F = S ≥ 0 (B.23)
Now consider an alternative compensation function:
W ′gp [C1 + C2] =

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The alternative compensation function clearly relaxes Constrain B.9,
such that it must now be slack. By construction Constraint B.8 must bind,
and the investor rationality constrain is unchanged. Also by construction
Constraint B.4, Constraint B.5, Constraint B.6 and Constraint B.7 remain
unchanged. Thus A′, W ′gp [C1 + C2] must also also implement the efficient
equilibrium.
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Using the result above, the following shows that if there exists an com-
pensation function which implements the efficient equilibrium, then there ex-
ists an alternative compensation function in the form given in Result 3 B which
also implements the efficient equilibrium.
First, I show that Wgp [X] = 0 w.l.o.g. Consider the case where there
exists a wage function which implements the equilibrium wage function,A,
Wgp [C1 + C2] in which Wgp [X] > 0. Note that the results above demonstrate
that we can assume without loss of generality that the constraints which ensure
the GP prefers the standard investment all bind (B.4, B.6 and B.8).
Now consider an alternative compensation function:
W ′gp [C1 + C2] =

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The alternative compensation function is bound by the GPs limited
liability constrains which requires Wgp [X] ≥ 0.
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As constraints B.6 and B.4 also hold with equality yields the entire
functional form:
WGP [C1 + C2] =
























F if C1 + C2 = 4X
(B.29)
Convexity Result

















F ≥ Wgp [X] = 0 (B.30)
Thus if the efficient equilibrium is implementable, there exists a com-
pensation function which is convex over C1 +C2 ∈ {0, 2X}, which will imple-
ment the efficient equilibrium.
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B.3 Result 4
Proof. As with the previous result, the achieving a first-best equilibrium re-
quires a pair of incentive computability constraints at each node. The con-
straints are identical to the previous case following C1 = 2X, C1 = X, but
following C1 = 0 the GP will only raise a new fund if he achieves C2 = 2X:
Incentive Compatibility Constraints
Following C1 = 2X:
(γ + αε)Wgp [4X]+(−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [3X]+(γ − ε)Wgp [2X] ≥ 0 (B.31)
(−γ + αε)Wgp [4X] + (2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [3X] + (−γ − ε)Wgp [2X] ≥ 0
(B.32)
Following C1 = X:
(γ + αε)Wgp [3X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [2X] + (γ − ε)Wgp [X] ≥ 0 (B.33)
(−γ + αε)Wgp [3X]+(2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [2X]+(−γ − ε)Wgp [X] ≥ 0 (B.34)
Following C1 = 0:
(γ + αε)Wgp [2X] + (−2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [X]− (γ − ε)F ≥ 0 (B.35)





























































































(γ + ε)F ≥ 0
(B.38)
Note that the first period constraints, B.37 and B.38 are not redundant,
as they were in the previous case. The solution is also constrained by the
typical investor rationality constraint, requiring LP’s to receive expected cash
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Result 4.A - Concavity of Wgp [C1 + C2]
Constraint B.43 can be re-arranged in the following form:
Wgp [2X] ≤
[




Wgp [X]− F (B.40)
Taking limε→+0 yields:
Wgp [2X] ≤ 2Wgp [X]− F (B.41)










By continuity Wgp [C1 + C2] must be concave in the region C1 + C2 ∈
[0, 2X] for ε ≤ ε̄.
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Result 4.B - Minimum value of Wgp [X]
Re-arranging Constraint B.43, and applying the monotonicity constraint
that Wgp [2X] ≥ Wgp [X] leads to :
(2γ + (1− α) ε)Wgp [X] ≥ (γ − αε)Wgp [2X] + (γ − ε)F (B.43)








This appendix describes the likelihood equations used in Section 3.3.1
to estimate parametric equations using the information from each individual
portfolio company investment. Each observations is the outcome of a single
portfolio company investment governed by the following model:
MIRRi,j = max [−100% , β0 + β1 · IRRNASDAQ + νt + αmeani + εi,j] (C.1)





Eq. C.1 describes the observed return as being a truncated at -100%,
and normally distributed around a mean which is exponentially related to a
linear combination of GP and market characteristics at the time the investment
is made. The variance of the error term, σ2i,j, is treated as a latent variable
which is determined by Eq. C.3. Taking logs of the normal distribution, the
resulting log likelihood for each observation is given by:
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, if MIRRi,j = −100%
(C.4)
After substituting Eq. C.3 for σ2i,j, parameter estimate are determined
by maximizing the following sum of Eq. C.4 over all portfolio company obser-
vations:
lnL (β, γ, ν, α, φ, δ | ...) =
∑
i,j
ln ` (β, γ, νt, αi, φ, δ |MIRRi,j) (C.5)
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